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Introduction
On July 18, 2013, at 4:06 p.m. Eastern Time, the City of Detroit entered
bankruptcy without a friend in the world. Its restructuring plan had no creditor
support.' Unlike for General Motors and Chrysler just a few years earlier, no
government bailout was on the horizon.2 Sidelined by a controversial state
financial emergency law, Detroit's residents and elected officials deemed the
bankruptcy illegitimate. 3 Unions, retiree groups, and the city's pension funds
were fighting in state court to block cuts they feared would come from a city
bankruptcy. 4
On November 7, 2014, the judge presiding over the Detroit bankruptcy
declared the turnaround of circumstances nothing short of miraculous.
5
1. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147,160, Supp. Op. (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) ("Both
before and after [the court's eligibility determination], nearly every creditor group filed litigation against
the City seeking the full protection of its claims.").
2. Transcript of In Re: Trial--Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 26, In re City of Detroit
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 1,2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7850 (testimony of Dan Gilbert about meeting
with high-ranking official in President Obama's administration); Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger,
Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter )! Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 884 (2014)
(discussing "extraordinary government intervention" in Chrysler).
3. Robin Erb, Crowd Expresses Anger Over Detroit 's Bankruptcy at Forum, DET. FREE
PRESS, Sept. 7, 2013 (describing assertions by local lawmakers and residents that bankruptcy was
"[p]remature, unfair and destructive"); Matt Helms & Joe Guillen, Lawsuit Challenges Michigan
Emergency Manager Law, USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 2013 (discussing responses to Michigan Public Act
436).
4. Gen. Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. Orr, No. 13-768-CZ (lngham Cty. Cir. Ct. July 17, 2013);
Flowers v. Snyder, No. 13-729-CZ (lngham Cty. Cir. Ct. July 3, 2013); Webster v. Snyder, No. 13-734-
CZ (lngham Cty. Cir. Ct. July 3, 2013); Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland/The Detroit Bankruptcy:
Why Debts Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die... and How They Are
Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 819-820 (2014) (discussing state court litigation).
5. Oral Opinion on the Record at 7, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E. D. Mich. Nov. 7,
2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF 8401 ("The pension settlement borders on the miraculous. No one could have
foreseen this result for the pension creditors when the City filed this case."); Nathan Bomey et al., Judge
OKs Bankruptcy Plan; a 'Miraculous' Outcome, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 7, 2014; Nathan Bomey et al.,
How Detroit Was Reborn: The Inside Story of the Detroit Bankruptcy Case, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 9,
2014 ("The confirmation was a slam dunk."). Later writings of the court also illustrate the notable
turnaround. In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at 228 (calling the $7 billion reduction in debt "a truly
remarkable achievement for the City, unprecedented in the history of municipal bankruptcy"); In re The
Detroit Bankruptcy
Organized creditor groups, including bondholders of various kinds, workers, and
retirees, had stopped fighting and signed on to the city's revised plan.6 The city's
elected officials committed to effectuate the plan.7 With strings attached, the state
of Michigan contributed funds to the effort,8 as did the Ford Foundation, the
Kresge Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, the Knight Foundation, and
others.9 The city obtained new private financing.1" Approval of the plan cleared
Detroit to shed more than $7 billion in debt and embark on reinvestment
initiatives to improve substandard municipal services. I1 All of this happened in
well under two years-a timeframe thought by many to be impossible.
In retrospective analyses, Detroit's major newspapers gave much of the
credit for this transformation to the federal court overseeing the case. 12 That story
line defies the conventional wisdom about municipal bankruptcies in the legal
world. Commentators have asserted for decades that the municipal bankruptcy
system, as established in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, abides by
Constitutional commands and federalism principles only if federal court
intervention is minimized. 13 Expressly reflecting this policy, section 904 of the
Bankruptcy Code prohibits the court from using a stay, order, or decree to
interfere in municipal decision making, expenditures, asset deployment, and the
Reasonableness of Fees at 47-48, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2015) (No. 13-53846),
2015 WL 603888 (in supplemental fee approval decision, noting "[iun utter contrast to the community
sense when the case was filed, the residents of the City as well as its community and political leaders now
justly feel and express a strong and genuine sense of enthusiasm, optimism and confidence about the
City's future").
6. In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at 162 (noting that "[t]he [c]ity has settled with
every major creditor group").
7. Transcript of Trial Re. Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-
53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 6, 2014), ECF No. 7917 (testimony of City Council President Brenda
Jones and Mayor Duggan); Gabe Leland, Councilman, Detroit City Council, Comments at Press
Conference on Emergence from Bankruptcy (Dec. 10, 2014) ("I'm not the biggest proponent of
bankruptcy, but at the end of the day, from a budget perspective we are better off today than we were 18
months ago"); Mike Duggan, Mayor, City of Detroit, Comments at Press Conference (Dec. 10, 2014)
(stating that Mayor and Detroit City Council support financial review commission that accompanies
emergence from bankruptcy); Matt Helms & Joe Guillen, Detroit Mayor: Bankruptcy Exit Plan 'Not
Without Risk', DET. FREE PRESS, Oct. 6, 2014 (Mayor Duggan: "I support this plan, and I believe it is
feasible").
8. In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at 172 (noting a state contribution of $194.8
million to the Detroit pension systems). The federal government also had chipped in a bit of grant money.
Chris Isidore, Detroit to Get $300 Million in Federal Help, CNN MONEY, Sept. 27, 2013.
9. In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at 169-70 (listing foundations that made financial
contributions).
10. Id. at 275-76 (discussing city's postpetition financing and exit financing).
11. Id. at 162.
12. Bomey etal., supra note 5; Daniel Howes et al., Bankruptcy and Beyond: The lnside
Story of the Deals that Brought Detroit Back from the Brink in Fifteen Months, DET. NEWS, Dec. 13, 2014.
See also Steven Church, Detroit Judge's Tough Tack Said to Speed Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 6,
2014 (discussing impact of presiding judge and lead mediator on Detroit's restructuring on eve of plan
confirmation decision); David Ashenfelter, Meet Gerald Rosen, The Judge Trying to Save Detroit,
DEADLINE DET., Dec. 6, 2013 (discussing Chief Judge Rosen, the lead mediator).
13. Infra Part I.A.
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like, without municipal consent. 14 A companion provision, section 903,
emphasizes this principle through its converse: Chapter 9 does not limit or impair
the power of a state to control a municipality or its expenditures.' 5 Moreover,
many provisions that authorize bankruptcy judge oversight do not apply to
municipalities. 16 Judges' role in municipal bankruptcy, we are typically told, is
to rule on disputes after evidentiary trials-first on a debtor's eligibility, later on
the confirmation of a plan, and occasionally on discrete disputes in between. 17
When critics have complained about lack of oversight, their proposed correctives
have operated in largely the same vein: courts should expressly withhold support
for eligibility and plan confirmation, they say, unless a municipality promises to
change its ways and pay creditors more. 1
8
Whatever one's view of the outcome in Detroit, the case shows that the
restrictions on formal federal court intervention in municipal bankruptcy, born
of federalism, enable creative courts to exercise pervasive control under the right
circumstances.19 Because Detroit entailed a remarkable level of interactivity
between the federal, state, and local governments, it exposes fertile ground for
federalism scholars.20  Notwithstanding the oft-stated policy of judicial
14. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (West 2004).
15. Id. § 903.
16. Infra Part I.A.
17. John Knox & Marc Levinson, AVOIDING AND USING CHAPTER 9 IN TIMES OF
FISCAL STRESS, (Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, 2009); Zack A. Clement & R. Andrew Black, How
City Finances Can Be Restructured. Learning from Both Bankruptcy and Contract Impairment Cases, 88
AM. BANKR. L.J. 41,47-48 (2014); David S. Kupetz, Standards for Confirming a Chapter 9 Plan of Debt
Adjustment: Incorporating and Diverging from Chapter II Plan Standards, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 289, 300
(2012). See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of
Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 291, 293 (2012); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 357 (2010); Lawrence P.
King, Municipal Insolvency: The New Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1164
(1976); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction
to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 435-36 (1993); Juliet Moringiello, Goals and
Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 413414 (2014); Frederick Tung,
After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 885, 898-99
(2002).
18. Infra Part I.C.
19. By studying and focusing on the court, this article is not meant to be a
comprehensive account of the institutions that shaped Detroit's bankruptcy. Margo Schlanger, Beyond the
Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2031-2035 (1999)
(critiquing institutional reform scholarship for court-centrism and for under-emphasizing strategic role of
other actors).
20. For a sampling of such competing theories, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather
K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering,
Coercion, and the Deep Structure ofAmerican Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2015); Heather K. Gerken,
Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 113-114 (2014) (calling for a more relational
account of federalism); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L. J. 1996 (2014); Alison
L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long Founding Moment, 67 STAN. L. REV.
397 (2015); Roderick M. Hills Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998); Robert A.
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005); Neil S. Seigel,
Commandeering and its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1627 (2006); and
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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minimalism, the language of section 904 technically does not restrict court
techniques that civil procedure, mass tort, and institutional reform litigation
scholars have discussed for decades.2 Indeed, the Detroit bankruptcy court
sometimes affirmatively used section 904 and its consent exception to exert
control in ways that case law and scholarship have not contemplated. Detroit's
Chapter 9 produced relatively little new doctrine.22 But it generated procedural
precedent-we'll call it the Detroit Blueprint. The blueprint is structured not
around discrete substantive issues but around levers of control: active case
management, 23 deal-making and settlement promotion, 24 team building,25 and a
"court of the people.- 26 The approach was facilitated by hand-selection of the
presiding judge by the chief circuit judge.27 That selection process presents
opportunities to coordinate a distinct philosophy-in this case, active and
pervasive federal court control.28
To enhance this study of the court's involvement in Detroit's bankruptcy, I
listened, in near-real time, to digital recordings of hearings, status conferences,
and adversary proceedings from the initial bankruptcy filing through the
effective date of the restructuring plan.29 This method, which I have not seen
used elsewhere, is more revealing of context and nuance in court-party
21. Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process; Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 900 (1999); Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the
Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257 (1985) (discussing "sea change... in the way
judges talk about settlement and think about their roles as judges"); Marc Galanter, ". . . A Settlement
Judge, not a Trial Judge: " Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J.L & Soc'Y 1,6 (1985); Jonathan
T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27 (2003); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982); Judith Resnik, Trial As Error, Jurisdiction as
Injury: Transforming the Meaning ofArticle Il, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924 (2000); Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027 (2013) (arguing that "proactive
jurist" has replaced "passive umpire" as dominant paradigm in federal district courts).
22. The resulting doctrine, while limited in scope, was not trivial. The bankruptcy court
held that pensions could be impaired in a federal bankruptcy case. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 150-
54 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (holding Michigan Constitution characterizes pension claims as contract
rights, and contract rights may be impaired in bankruptcy). The court's plan confirmation ruling sets forth
new interpretations of the statutory requirements for nonconsensual plans. In re City of Detroit, supra note
1, at 253-261 (discussing unfair discrimination and fair and equitable standards). The court also made new
law on the dischargeability of civil rights claims and the nondischargeability of Takings Clause claims.
Id. at 263-64, 267-70.
23. Infra Part III.B.
24. Infra Part III.C.
25. Infra Part III.D.
26. Infra Part III.E.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 921(b) (2012) ("The chiefjudge of the court of appeals for the circuit
embracing the district in which the case is commenced shall designate the bankruptcy judge to conduct
the case.").
28. Infra Part Il.A.
29. The study fits within a broader project comparing the work of bankruptcy courts
with that of their federal district counterparts. Other components of that project include Melissa B. Jacoby,
Superdelegation and Gatekeeping in Bankruptcy Courts, 87 TEMPLE L. REV. 875 (2015); Melissa B.
Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, 41 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 849 (2014); Melissa B. Jacoby,
Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401
(2006); and Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 571 (2015).
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interactions than published opinions, secondary accounts, or after-the-fact
transcript review standing alone.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the standard account of the
minimal role of judges in municipal bankruptcy, and introduces section 904's
role as a debtor protection with strong federalist underpinnings. Part I also offers
the common critique that, like the standard account, relies on a traditional
conception ofjudicial work. Looking to other litigation contexts, Part I1 presents
a competing narrative of court control that prompts scrutiny of both the
conventional wisdom and the common critique of municipal bankruptcy. Part 11
then introduces the Detroit bankruptcy and describes the research methods. Part
III, based on observational and primary source research, presents the Detroit
Blueprint. It is draws on examples within the bankruptcy to identify the discrete
elements of court oversight mentioned earlier.
Part IV reconsiders the federalist assumptions about municipal bankruptcy
in light of the Detroit Blueprint.3" First, I discuss Detroit's impact on other
municipalities in distress and conclude it cannot be dismissed as sui generis. On
the other hand, courts' ability to implement the strategy or something like it
depends on the intersection of federal court coordination around an oversight
philosophy,31 and state municipal takeover law.32 For example, a federal judge
might perceive the federalist costs of active oversight to be sufficiently modest
when a state already has restricted a municipality's self-governance. Even then,
however, a bankruptcy court cannot act in isolation in a high profile case; it needs
buy-in from the district and circuit courts. Next, I discuss why section 904 does
not fulfill its federalist objectives.33 The first problem is that the section focuses
on formal judicial acts, leaving pathways to exercise extensive control while
being literally faithful to the statute. The second problem is that the consent
exception is not a reliable regulator of court behavior when when judges (rather
than creditors or the debtor) are raising the exception sua sponte. The
implications go beyond federalism, and raise bigger questions about the
sufficiency of constraints on the federal judiciary.
I. Municipal Bankruptcy: Doctrinal Framework and the Standard Account
A. A Chapter Not Like the Others
Chapter 9 for municipalities is known as distinct from bankruptcy for
individuals and business entities. Certain fundamental principles and powers still
30. Other elements of the research in Part III will be addressed in later work. See, e.g.,
Melissa B. Jacoby & Dana A. Remus, Judges as Mediators (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(situating Detroit within broader settlement-promotion trends).
31. See infra Part IV.A.1
32. See infra Part IV.A.2.
33. See infra Part IV.B.
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operate-filing a petition immediately shields a city from its creditors,34 and the
city can impair contracts and shed debt if a court confirms a debtor's plan of
adjustment. 35 Yet, Chapter 9 excludes many Bankruptcy Code provisions that
amplify court and creditor oversight in other kinds of cases. For example, in a
Chapter 9, which creates no bankruptcy estate, the debtor can sell property
without court permission, even outside of the ordinary course of business.
36
Unilateral actions that could trigger the appointment of a trustee in other cases
generate no such consequence for a municipality. 37 Creditors cannot file an
involuntary bankruptcy, reflecting the sovereign state's role in determining a
municipality's access to a federal bankruptcy regime. 38 And, unlike in Chapter
11, only the municipality is ever authorized to file a plan of adjustment. 39 Neither
the court nor creditors can directly force a liquidation of a municipality's assets
in bankruptcy.
Municipal bankruptcy nonetheless has become far more like corporate
bankruptcy over time. Originally, statutory provisions applicable to municipal
bankruptcy were self-contained; the text did not borrow provisions from other
chapters. Since the 1970s, many provisions elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code
have been extended to municipal cases.4° In addition, prior to 1976,
municipalities were expected to come into bankruptcy with a debt restructuring
plan already hammered out, bondholder votes counted. 41 That structure not only
made Chapter 9 more difficult to use, but left less for a court to do or oversee. In
34. 11 U.S.C §§ 362(a), 922 (2012); In re Jefferson Cty., Ala., 484 B.R. 427 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 2012); Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, supra note 29, at 855 (discussing court's
expansion of the automatic stay to other parties working for the debtor and to the state).
35. 11 U.S.C § 944(b) (2012) (providing for discharge of debts unless otherwise
provided).
36. Id. § 901 (excluding section 363 from Chapter 9). But see id. § 549 (imposing some
restrictions on post-petition transactional freedom).
37. Id. § 901 (excluding section 1104). Although the process is nothing like Chapter 7
liquidation, states can dissolve municipalities, and it is possible a municipality could go through
bankruptcy and then be dissolved. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364,
1387-88 (2012) ("The records gathered for this Article indicate that more municipalities dissolved in the
past fifteen years than at any time before that."); John H. Knox & Chris Hutchison, Municipal
Disincorporation in California, 32 PuB. L.J. 1,4 (2009).
38. The Role of Public Employee Pensions in Contributing to State Insolvency and the
Possibility of a State Bankruptcy Chapter: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial and
Administrative Law (2011), available at http://newnbc.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/NBC-
Statement-on-State-Bankruptcy-2-14-201 I.pdf (statement of the National Bankruptcy Conference).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012).
40. Id. § 901 (2012) (containing the list).
41. King, supra note 17, at 1158; Amended Opinion Regarding Confirmation and
Status of CaIPERS, In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35, 50 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015) (summarizing history
of Chapter 9 and stating that, prior to 1976, municipal debt adjustment was limited, requiring prepackaged
plans); Hon. Thomas B. Bennett, Consent: Its Scope, Blips, Blemishes, and a Bekins Extrapolation Too
Far, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 3, 11 (2015) (1937 Act "was designed to be essentially a prepackaged plan").
Judge Bennett observes that current Chapter 9 goes well beyond the limited municipal bankruptcy statute
the Supreme Court upheld in United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). Id. at 13.
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1976, Congress rewrote Chapter 9 to allow municipalities to enter bankruptcy
even without the requisite majority of votes already in hand.42
Experts primarily have focused on the most explicit channels through which
federal courts exert influence in this system: eligibility and plan confirmation. A
judge determines a debtor's eligibility on the front end of a case, albeit not
necessarily right away.4 3 That assessment, with fact-intensive elements, is not
proforma, particularly because it is coupled with the power to dismiss the case.44
On the back end, a judge decides whether to confirm the municipality's plan of
adjustment.4 5 The plan confirmation requirements are multi-faceted, and
notoriously controversial as applied to a municipality.4 6 It also is well known that
parties may ask judges to rule on a municipality's request to assume or reject
contracts, or on requests to lift the automatic stay. 47 These moments of influence
are not trivial. But this list is substantially shorter than for other kinds of
bankruptcy cases.
B. The Express Federalist Command of Section 904
1. The Role of Section 904
The 1976 revisions to municipal bankruptcy, carried forward in the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, retained a provision affirmatively limiting federal court
intervention. Cognizant of the Supreme Court's expression of "a stronger policy
of Federalism and States' Rights," reads a House Judiciary Committee Report
from 1977, "this bill takes greater care to insure that there is no interference in
the political or governmental functions of a municipality that is proceeding under
42. King, supra note 17, at 1158.
43. In re City of Stockton, California, 475 B.R. 720 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (calling
eligibility the initial judicial task in every Chapter 9); Jacoby, Detroit Pre-Eligibility, supra note 29, at
852-53 (reviewing criteria, noting the variable timing of the eligibility determination, and identifying
multiple matters the court addressed before beginning the eligibility trial).
44. 11 U.S.C § 109(c) (2012) (listing eligibility requirements); In re City of Bridgeport,
129 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (finding Bridgeport not insolvent, thus ineligible); In re Boise
Cty., 465 B.R. 156, 157 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011) (same); In re Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 745 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 2011) (finding city ineligible because city council lacked authority to file the petition).
45. 11 U.S.C § 943(b) (2012) (identifying plan confirmation requirements); In re
Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 30 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999); Gillette, supra note 17, at 294;
Kupetz, supra note 17, at 300.
46. Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners, Bondholders, and Unfair Discrimination in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 17 U. PA. J. BUs. L. 1 (2014); Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Fair and
Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 25 (2015); C. Scott Pryor,
Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less is Doing Best, 88 AM. BANKR. L. J. 85 (2014).
47. Patrick Darby, Restructuring Municipal Debt in Chapter 9, Nat'l Conf. of Bankr.
Judges Ann. Mtg. 2013, at 24; id. at 25 ("[The bankruptcy judge's lack of power to tell the debtor what
to do... means that the debtor cannot simply lay its difficulties on the desk of the bankruptcy judge to be
solved."). Oversight of contract rejection includes requests to reject collective bargaining agreements. In
re City of Vallejo, 432 B.R. 262 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Ryan Preston Dahl, Collective Bargaining Agreements
and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L. J. 295 (2007); Knox & Levinson, supra note 17, at 22, 25.
Vol. 33, 2016
Detroit Bankruptcy
Chapter 9, or of the State in its power to control its municipalities. '48 Section 904
prohibits the federal court from "interfering" with the municipality's political
governmental powers, property or revenues, or use of income-producing
property during the case, without its consent.49 The prohibition is often attributed
to the Tenth Amendment, and sometimes to federalism principles more
generally.5" Adherents to that foundation cite the U.S. Supreme Court decisions
that, in turn, invalidated America's first municipal bankruptcy law and upheld
the second.5 The Bekins Court's ability to uphold the successor law depended
on finding it further restricted the federal court's role.52 A companion statutory
provision, section 903, says that Chapter 9 does not limit or impair the power of
a state to control a municipality or its expenditures.
53
Section 904's very existence indicates that state consent to a municipal
bankruptcy does not eliminate federalism concerns.54 In other words, a state does
not succumb to any and all acts the federal court might wish to take just because
it authorized its municipality to file. 55 To the court presiding over the bankruptcy
of Stockton, California, section 904 was the functional equivalent of the "cleanup
hitter in baseball" in walling off courts from the affairs of bankrupt
municipalities. 56 The provision, the court explained, overrides other sources of
48. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 262-63 (1977) (citing the later-overruled Nat'l League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, The Tenth Amendment and the
New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1871 (1976)); id. at 321 (prohibiting creditor-initiated municipal
bankruptcy petitions "because to do so may constitute an invasion of State sovereignty contrary to the
Tenth Amendment, and would constitute bad policy").
49. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
50. See, e.g., In re Jefferson Cty., Ala., 474 B.R. 228, 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012);
Ass'n of Retired Empl. v. City of Stockton, 478 BR. 8, 17 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012); Moringiello, supra
note 17, at 410; Tung, supra note 17, at 890; see also In re New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 434
B.R. 131, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding capacity to consent limited by section 903, principles of
federalism).
51. Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936);
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 46, 52 (1938). But see Bennett, supra note 41, at 6 (Ashton does not
say what part of 1934 Act "transgressed the demarcations set by the Tenth Amendment"); Thomas Moers
Mayer, State Sovereignty, State Bankruptcy, and a Reconsideration of Chapter 9, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J.
363, 370 (2011) (noting these decisions barely mention the Tenth Amendment).
52. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, supra note 38, at 9-10.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012); Juliet Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards
and the Role of State Choices, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71 (2015).
54. Some writings suggest it is an open question whether the Tenth Amendment
requires section 904. See, e.g., David L. Dubrow, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Viable Option for
Municipalities in Fiscal Crisis? 24 URB. LAW. 549, 553 (1992); Gillette, supra note 17, at 296 (referring
to questions "that allegedly underlie the nonintervention principle"); id. at 327 (rejecting idea that "the
shibboleth of federalism" prevents consideration of his proposals). Judge Rhodes' plan confirmation
decision suggests ambivalence. See In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at 250. Under present
understandings, scholars say, the Tenth Amendment is not an independent or additional limit on
Congressional authority to legislate. Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers ofArticle 1, 123 YALE L.J.
2044, 2087-2088 (2014); Adam Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 81, 106 (2012) (discussing shifts in scope and meaning of Tenth Amendment).
55. Bennett, supra note 41, at 6.
56. Ass'n of Retired Empl. v. City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 13 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012)
(section 904 forbids court from enjoining health benefit reductions).
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federal court power.57 Unless the debtor has consented (discussed next), "a
federal court can use no tool in its toolkit-no inherent authority power, no
implied equitable power, no Bankruptcy Code § 105 power, no writ, no stay, no
order."58 Juliet Moringiello has explained that an active federal judicial role is
unnecessary in municipal bankruptcy, where bankruptcy's role is to impair
claims over the objection of holdout creditors.59 The rest of municipal reform,
she says, is up to the states.
60
2. The Consent Exception
In 1976, Congress added a consent exception to section 904 that continues
in the statute today.6 1 According to a House Report and an authoritative treatise,
the addition was a clarification, not a weakening of the proscription against court
interference. 62 There is no indication that the consent exception was meant to
effect a big change, or really any change, in the law.63 The amendment aimed to
ensure that section 904 remained a shield for the state and municipality, rather
than a sword for a recalcitrant creditor for its own ends.64 The provision expressly
gives a municipality the power to ask for the court's assistance. 65 For example, a
57. ld. at 19.
58. Id. at 20; Kupetz, supra note 17, at 300. A few decisions have addressed these issues
differently. In Castle Pines, a creditors' committee requested that the debtor pay the committee's
professional fees. The court called such a payment the municipality's "price of admission" for the right to
impair contracts; if the municipality did not want to pay, it could dismiss the case. In re Castle Pines North
Metro. Dist., 129 B.R. 233, 235 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991). Castle Pines does not seem to have attracted a
following. In Orange County, an employee association successfully requested that the court enjoin the
city from making a unilateral change to a collective bargaining agreement. Based on the opinion, it appears
that the parties disputed the applicable standard rather than whether section 904 prevented an injunction
without debtor consent. In re Cty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 177 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). In a separate dispute,
however, the court declined the creditors' request to order Orange County to pay compensation to
committee professionals on an interim basis because the debtor had not consented. In re Cty. of Orange,
179 BR. 195, 199 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
59. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 46, 53 (1938) ("we have co-operation to
provide a remedy for a serious condition in which the States alone were unable to afford relief");
Moringiello, supra note 17, at 409 ("Chapter 9 bankruptcy was designed to complement, rather than
replace, state financial intervention plans."); id. at 452 ("No one intended for federal legislation to operate
alone to solve the municipal debt problem ...."); Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal
Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1106 (1997).
60. Moringiello, supra note 17.
61. Section 904 thus includes the clause "unless the debtor consents .. 1.." I  U.S.C. §
904 (2012).
62. H.R. REP. No. 94-686, at 18 (1975) (citing Leco Props. v. Crummer, 128 F.2d 110
(5th Cir. 1942)); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1J 904.02.
63. H.R. REP. No. 94-686, supra note 62, at 18 (noting intention to codify Leco and to
maintain the holding of Spellings v. Dewey, 122 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1941), which reversed injunctions the
court had imposed on a local election because challengers would not execute the plan of adjustment).
64. COLLIER, supra note 62.
65. Knox & Levinson, supra note 17, at 22.
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municipal debtor may ask the court to review and approve a settlement with
creditors .66
Section 904's consent clause has produced little case law. In a typical court
decision, a creditor asks a court to instruct the debtor to do something that the
debtor opposes.67 The history and case law focus on debtor or creditor requests
for intervention. I have found no analysis of courts making requests for consent
under section 904 sua sponte.68 That context would involve different dynamics,
and a larger encroachment on federalist principles to the extent parties do not
feel free to resist a judge's preferences. Whether in constitutional law or private
contract enforcement, nominal agreement is not always taken at face value.69
Concern about compulsion by government actors is longstanding.7" The Supreme
Court recently reinforced that federalism protects individuals as well as the
states. 71 recognizing a broader range of parties potentially harmed by federal
overreach. Moreover, NFIB v. Sebelius illustrates the potential for coercion
inherent in requests for consent by federal governmental actors. 72 Whatever
one's view of NFIB, it reminds us that withholding consent from a powerful
federal actor-including a federal court---can be perceived as costly.
73
66. In re City of Stockton, 486 B.R. 194, 199 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (stating
municipality may, but is not required to, seek approval of a settlement); In re Barnwell Co. Hosp., 491
B.R. 408, 417 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2013) (evaluating settlement at debtor's request).
67. Stockton, 478 B.R. at 20; Kupetz, supra note 17, at 300. Rejecting a creditor's
request to force the debtor to pay certain commissions, a New York judge noted, "[s]ection 904's
command is clear." In re New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 434 B.R. 131, 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010) (noting section 904 protects debtors from a federal court "meddling with their political or
governmental powers").
68. One can find plenty of discussion of consent elsewhere in bankruptcy. Wellness
Int'l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating
Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 663, 679 (2009).
69. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study
in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REv. 1283, 1289 (2013). See also Jacoby &
Janger, supra note 2, at 943 (discussing economic duress).
70. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984).
71. Bond v. United States (Bond 1), 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2363-64 (2011) (without quoting
Tenth Amendment, stating, "The individual, in a proper case, can assert injury from governmental action
taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines. Her rights in this regard do not belong to a State.");
Mayer, supra note 51, at 364.
72. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 256 (2012). In NFIB, the Supreme
Court invalidated portions of the Affordable Care Act that conditioned existing Medicaid funding on
states' expansion of their programs. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that if
"conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are
properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes." Id. at 2604 (analogizing
inducement to a "gun to the head").
73. The line between congressional command and federal court action can be blurry;
for example, Supreme Court Justices recently raised concerns about how a ruling might, as a practical
matter, impose undue pressure on states. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-18, King v. Burwell, 135 S.
Ct. 2480 (2015) (questions of Justices Sotomayor and Kennedy). The case was decided in a way that
obviated that concern. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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C. The Prevailing Critiques
Critiques of municipal bankruptcy tend to focus on disutility and moral
hazard: debtors are insufficiently incentivized to reform or maximize creditor
payment. To some, a solution lies in greater judicial intervention. Yet, like the
conventional wisdom, the resulting proposals have focused on the big
evidentiary trials.74 In a frequently-cited article from the 1990s, McConnell and
Picker suggested that "[b]ankruptcy could be used to force politically unpopular,
but sensible, decisions such as elimination of municipal functions, privatization,
and changes in tax law." 75 Their proposed path involved judges aggressively
scrutinizing restructuring plans, usually in ways that would push debtors to pay
creditors more. 76 Clayton Gillette has argued that courts should require
municipalities to pay "affordable, if unpopular, obligations," to counter the
strategic behavior of local officials. 77 His focal points were, again, eligibility and
plan confirmation. 78
The critics' proposals accurately reflect untapped leverage for judges from
their gatekeeping responsibilities.79 But there are at least two problems with the
model. First, the perceived channels for leverage are way too limited. Second,
court leverage is more distributionally indeterminate than the critiques suggest;
in other words, court involvement will not necessarily operate as a one-way
ratchet to increase creditor returns.
74. Gillette, supra note 17, at 291, 295, 326; Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2016);
McConnell & Picker, supra note 17, at 427, 470. This view contrasts with discussions about corporate
bankruptcy in the 1990s, in which scholars complained that judges were more obstacle than facilitator to
efficient outcomes. Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv.
503 (2001) (reviewing and analyzing literature).
75. McConnell & Picker, supra note 17, at 472.
76. Id. at 474. They focused particularly on the best interest of creditors test. 11 U.S.C
§ 943(b)(7) (2004). But see Kordana, supra note 59, at 1058-59, 1106 (disagreeing that judges should
push for municipal tax increases).
77. Gillette, supra note 17, at 291, 295, 326; Gillette & Skeel, supra note 74.
78. Gillette, supra note 17, at 293-95, 296, 325-27 (noting courts would have few
incentives to impose excessive resource adjustments); Clayton P. Gillette, What States Can Learn from
Municipal Insolvency, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE
AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 99, 107 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel Jr. Eds., 2012) ("A
court "obviously retains substantial discretion to condition that confirmation on the inclusion of tax
increases or service reductions.").
79. McConnell and Picker recognized that their proposals would constitute a "radical
revision in the theory of Chapter 9, but also reconsideration of some of the basic common law principles
of municipal debt collection." McConnell & Picker, supra note 17, at 775.
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II. What's Wrong with This Picture? Beyond the Standard Account in Theory
and in Reality
A. Managerial Judging and Beyond
The municipal bankruptcy scholarship often conveys the sense that,
because the debtor is a unit of a sovereign state, judges will sit by idly while a
case proceeds at whatever pace a debtor sets for it. Federal court and procedure
scholars have spoken a different language than municipal bankruptcy scholars
about court oversight.80 In the second half of the twentieth century, as Judith
Resnik has recounted, the federal court system came to evaluate judges by how
well they expedited resolution and avoided trials rather than how well they
presided over them.81 By the late 1970s, district judges were encouraged to take
active control over their dockets and cases through a variety of measures. 82 With
varying levels of enthusiasm, scholars have documented courts' heavy use of
informal and non-adversarial techniques to expedite proceedings, discourage
litigation, direct fact-gathering, and encourage settlement.83 By some accounts,
the courts have moved from dispute resolution to problem solving.84 Altogether,
such techniques, often discretionary, afford the federal judiciary significant
control in ways harder to track than rulings after trials or injunctive orders on
which municipal scholars tend to focus. That context alone complicates the
federalist story of municipal bankruptcy.
In other contexts, the presence of state actors has not prevented the
application of active judicial oversight and docket-moving norms. Indeed,
institutional reform litigation-aimed at curing alleged constitutional violations
in prisons, schools, or the like-was a forum for oversight experimentation.
When Abram Chayes identified characteristics of "public law litigation" in the
1970s, he observed a more sprawling party structure, a predictive rather than
retrospective factual inquiry, and a negotiated rather than imposed remedy.
8 5
The techniques for many federal actions (including but not limited to institutional
reform) span detailed case management orders;86 statements (whether in public
80. Supra note 21.
81. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494 (1986); Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 21; Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 21.
82. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?, supra note 29, at 575-76
(documenting how federal district judges changed conceptualization of their roles).
83. Supra note 21; Molot, supra note 21, at 89 (discussing "regularization of judicial
management tactics that fall between formal and informal extremes").
84. Edward H. Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Perspective,
in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 269, 270-71 (A. Leo Levin &
Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
85. Chayes, supra note 21, at 1302. For the judge presiding over such cases, Chayes
saw an obligation to shape the process to ensure a just and viable outcome. Id.
86. Supra note 81.
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or in chambers) promoting settlement and sometimes offering the terms;8 7 ex
parte communication;8 8 recruiting and delegating to teams of helpers who expand
the court's reach and interaction with parties;89 inquisitorial methods; 90 public
statements through unconventional channels and press conferences; 9' and
hearings for non-parties and in locations away from the court's home base.92 In
other words, judges have taken active and wide-ranging roles in a variety of
cases--even in those generating complex and controversial interactions between
federal courts and state and local institutions.
93
87. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 75 (2007)
(discussing role of Judge Weinstein in Agent Orange, such as providing the dollar figure for settlement
on the eve of trial and playing an active role in orchestrating settlement); RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING
THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 25 (1991) (documenting settlement
promotion); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example,
55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337, 343 (1986) ("From the moment that Judge Weinstein replaced Judge Pratt... the
goal of settlement was uppermost in his mind.").
88. SOBOL, supra note 87, at 32 (discussing judicial practices in A.H. Robins).
89. SOBOL, supra note 87 (court recruitment of help in A.H. Robins); Elwood Hain,
Sealing off the City: School Desegregation in Detroit, in LIMITS OF JUSTICE: THE COURTS' ROLE IN
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 234-74, 282 (Howard I. Kolodner & James J. Fishman, eds. 1978) (describing
Judge DeMascio's use of non-testifying expert advisors in in Detroit school desegregation case Bradley
v. Milliken); Robert E. Buckholz, Jr. et al., Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 826 (1978) (discussing use of masters, special masters, hearing
officers, monitors, various committees, and ombudspersons). To manage the Agent Orange litigation,
Judge Jack Weinstein created a "special bureaucracy" that included extra law clerks, paralegals, a
magistrate, at least seven special masters, and consultants. PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL:
MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 342-44 (1986); Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge
Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2014, 2019
(1997); Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedures, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2131, 2148 (1989).
90. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process,
and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005) (exploring roots
of inquisitorial techniques in American and English jurisprudence); Frederic M. Bloom, Information Lost
and Found, 100 CAL. L. REV. 635, 667 (2012) (arguing American civil practice is not adversarial "from
bottom to top"); Howard Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983,
1985, 2010-2011 (1999) (documenting American courts' use of inquisitorial methods in mass tort cases
in response to shortcomings of adversarial system in this context); John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 858 (1985) (discussing inquisitorial features of
American courts that lack safeguards of German system).
91. Hain, supra note 89, at 277 (noting that Judge DeMascio held meetings with school
board president, other local officials before releasing high-profile court decision in Detroit school
desegregation case); id. at 242 (describing Judge Roth press conference explaining plan implementation,
deflecting NAACP criticisms).
92. Jack Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469,
541 (1994) (arguing in both mass tort and institutional reform, "[a] rigid and unresponsive judiciary, blind
to the needs of various communities and of society at large, is far more likely to cause an erosion of public
confidence in legal institutions than a judiciary perceived as overly interested in resolving the problems
before it"); id. at 542 (discussing public hearings he held in school desegregation case); id. at 543 (stating,
in mass tort case, he held hearings all over the country).
93. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
JUDGES AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS 20-21 (1988) (challenges associated with developing adequate
remedy while limiting interference with local government policy and practice); DONALD L. HOROWITZ,
THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977) (case studies raising questions about courts' institutional
capacity); Chayes, supra note 21, at 1309 ("Can the disinterestedness of the judge be sustained, for
example, when he is more visibly part of the political process?"); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C.
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Although long identified as a relevant counterpoint, particularly to
corporate bankruptcy,94 institutional reform litigation is distinct from bankruptcy
in ways important to this discussion. In prison or school reform cases, an active
role for judges is prompted by a constitutional violation. 95 In municipal
bankruptcy, the federal court's involvement, rather than the underlying financial
problem, is the element more likely to provoke constitutional challenge.96 Such
distinctions, however, do not explain or justify the dramatic difference in
scholarly analysis. At the very least, in both contexts, judges may perceive the
need to fill gaps left by failures of the political process.
In bankruptcy research, scholars have been only modestly and
intermittently engaged with trends in federal court oversight methods. 9 That
pattern is odd given the perceived centrality of negotiation, compromise, and
litigation avoidance to bankruptcy, making it amenable (or vulnerable) to judicial
creativity to cultivate these norms. Rather than connecting such dynamics to the
complex litigation universe, 98 corporate bankruptcy scholars tend to characterize
bankruptcy as an extension of the private transactional realm, with judges
external to that world.99 As Part I conveyed, municipal bankruptcy literature is
even further removed from the debates about how federal courts exercise power
in the modem judiciary. Given that municipal bankruptcy seems to depend even
Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 468
(1980) (clash between "steely-eyed judge of national prominence" and a "recalcitrant state bureaucracy").
94. Scholars identifying corporate restructuring as a useful analogy for purposes of
understanding institutional reform litigation include Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, supra
note 93, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilizing Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1057, 1061-66 (2004); Susan P. Sturm, A
Normative Theory ofPublic Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L. J. 1355, 1432 n402 (1991); Susan Sturm, Resolving
the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention by Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1990).
95. Hon. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform,
in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 87,
107 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler, eds. 1979).
96. See generally United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 46, 52 (1938); Ashton v.
Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936);.
97. Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter I/?, supra note 29.
Exceptions to this claim include John D. Ayer, The Forms ofAction in Bankruptcy Practice: An Exposition
anda Critique, 1985 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 306 (William L. Norton ed., 1985); John D. Ayer, How to
Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355 (1986); Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-
Controlled, supra note 29; Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and
Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2001); Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a
Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 657-58 (2008); and Daniel Bussel,
A Third Way: Examiners as Inquisitors, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2016). See also sources cited
supra note 94 (sources focusing on other areas of law analogizing to bankruptcy).
98. Exceptions largely arise from those who study mass tort and other aggregate
litigation. S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE STUDIES OF MASS TORT LIMITED FUND
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS & BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS 106, 152 (2000); Troy McKenzie,
Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Non-Class Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y. U. L. REV. 960 (2012).
99. For an example of the transactional frame, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Welcome Back,
SEC? 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 573, 576 (2010).
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more on negotiation and compromise, 00 it is time to examine municipal
bankruptcy as we would other complex litigation. Doing so will not only enrich
debates about the legacy of managerial judging, but also shed light on whether
there really is a stable federalist core to the municipal bankruptcy process.
B. Detroit Bankruptcy Background
Detroit was the biggest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history when it was
filed. 10 The city's financial troubles were decades in the making, 2 intertwined
with social and political challenges.'013 The state appointed emergency managers
for Detroit as well as other municipalities in Michigan pursuant to the state's
financial emergency law, disempowering the elected representatives of a
majority of Michigan's African-American residents."°4 The emergency manager
and governor, rather than Detroit's elected officials, filed bankruptcy on the
city's behalf-a step many Detroit residents perceived as illegitimate.
Meanwhile, the emergency manager's initial restructuring plan had no creditor
support. The presiding judge was acutely aware of these layers of context. 10 5
Although the bankruptcy looked intractable at the time of filing, Detroit
tackled a lot in the next eighteen months. It not only reduced its debt, but made
significant operational and management changes, 0 6 planned and funded
investment initiatives, 07 and negotiated a regional water authority. 0 8 The state
established fiscal oversight through the Detroit Financial Review Commission
100. Reporter's Transcript of Daily Proceedings at 515, In re City of Stockton (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. March 27, 2014) (No. 12-321118-C-9) ("the Chapter II negotiation model applies in Chapter 9
cases on steroids"); In re City of Stockton, California, 475 B.R. 720, 724, 731-32 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012)
(noting federal policy favoring settlement and compromise in Chapter 9 cases).
101. Inre City ofDetroit, 504 B.R. 97, 178 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
102. Id. at 112; Heather Lennox, Panic in Detroit: Chapter 9 Process From Soup to
Nuts 6 (American Bankr. Inst., Working Paper, Apr. 18, 2015).
103. See generally THOMAS J. SUGRUE, ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND
INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (Princeton Classics Ed. 2014); Peter J. Hammer & Michael Schank,
Detroit on the Brink, THE HILL, Oct. 29, 2014; Letter from Peter Hammer to Judge Steven W. Rhodes
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.d-rem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Hammer-Ltr-2-Rhodes-final-09-01-
14.pdf (expressing concern that "issues of race and regionalism would be marginalized" in Detroit's plan
of adjustment). Poverty and racial tension are common among cities facing bankruptcy or other state
interventions. Anderson, Dissolving Cities, supra note 37, at 1407, 1411-1415, 1442; Michelle Wilde
Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1125, 1133-34, 1136-37 (2014).
104. Chris Lewis, Does Michigan's Financial Emergency Law Disenfranchise Black
Citizens?, THE ATLANTIC, May 9, 2013; Chris Savage, The Scandal of Michigan's Emergency Managers,
THE NATION, Mar. 5-12, 2012. See generally David Unkovic, Municipal Distress: Reflections of a
Receiver, 24 WIDENER L.J. 9 (2015) (recognizing undemocratic nature of Harrisburg receivership, but
arguing its essentialness to city's recovery).
105. In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at 277.
106. Id. at 134-35.
107. Id. at 7 (noting investment of approximately $1.7 billion in initiatives over ten
years, predicted to result in approximately $841 million in revenue savings); Lennox, supra note 102, at
38.
108. In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at 198.
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as part of a multiparty deal known as the Grand Bargain. 0 9 The Grand Bargain
protected the Detroit Institute of Arts from creditors and permanently put it in a
trust.'10 The Grand Bargain also reduced the cuts to pensions for public workers
and retirees." 1 Many of these outcomes had been unimaginable at the outset of
the case.
The case's resolution was hardly free of controversy. Certificate of
participation holders and bond insurers fought the city's plan until a last-minute
settlement. Even though retirees avoided more severe cuts to pensions, their
insurance benefits changed radically and their out-of-pocket bills skyrocketed.
Claimants with the least representation received among the lowest return in the
bankruptcy - debt instruments rather than cash, likely worth no more than ten
cents on the dollar of their claims. Some say the bankruptcy has benefitted
gentrified, centrally-located, and whiter areas far more than the bulk of the
neighborhoods; thousands of low-income residents have lost running water due
to the inability to pay their utility bills. Whatever one's assessment of these
issues, doing so much in such a short time was, indeed, remarkable.
C. Studying the Detroit Bankruptcy
Part III is based on listening to digital recordings of court hearings in near-
real time and monitoring the docket." 2 The presiding judge held most status and
pretrial conferences in Detroit's bankruptcy on the record in open court,
increasing the court activity visible to the public.' ' 3 For citation purposes, 1
replaced references to audio files with transcripts as they came available. But in
nearly all instances, I drew inferences about tone, dynamics, and context
109. ld supra note 1, at 176-99.
110. Id, supra note 1, at 169-70.
Ill. Id., supra note 1, at 171. Detroit's emergency manager initially called for big cuts.
CITY OF DETROIT, PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS 109 (June 14, 2013) ("[T]here must be significant cuts in
accrued, vested pension amounts for both active and currently retired persons.").
112. The closest analogy is conversation analysis from sociolinguistics. JOHN M.
CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND POWER 20 (2d Ed. 2005); John
M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of Judicial Decision
Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467 (1987). Digital audio recordings are not consistently
produced and released by other courts. Courts have not adopted and implemented the technology to the
extent hoped. Pilot Project Update: Digital Audio Recordings Online, The Third Branch, June 2008
(quoting Judge Rich Leonard: "It's gone from a novel tool to an anticipated product, with fairly high
usage ... I consider it a great advance in making our federal courts transparent").
113. Transcript of Hearing Re. Status Conference at 8-9, In re City of Detroit (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2013) (No. 13-53846) ECF No. 316 (court committing to "facilitate, to the greatest
extent possible, public access to the Court's proceedings"); Transcript of Hearing, In Re Motion of the
Debtor for a Final Order at 10, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2013) (No. 13-53846),
ECF No. 2280 (judge explaining intent not to have off-the-record conversations, but holding sidebar with
lawyers for Detroit and Syncora due to undisclosed circumstance); Judge Information - Judge Steven W.
Rhodes, Status Conferences, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN, www.mieb.uscourts.gov/judges-info/judge-rhodes (last visited Dec. 25, 2015). See also
sources cited infra note 115 (non-public hearings).
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primarily from audio recordings." 4 By my count, all but two digital audio
recordings of official court hearings were made available.115
Other elements of court oversight posed barriers to observation. A
significant amount of activity was sent to confidential mediation overseen by the
Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Michigan. 16 Behind-the-scenes
negotiation is part of all bankruptcies. Action in the courtroom never reveals all.
The distinction here is the role of a life-tenured judge in the process, giving rise
to nearly unlimited opportunities for federal court influence without the public's
watchful eye." 7 In addition, court-appointed adjuncts engaged in private
interactions with city officials and other parties."'
These caveats notwithstanding, the available record suggests that the
federal court did much more than provide a forum for traditional adjudicative
services." 9 Part III illustrates the subtle and varied ways in which the federal
court was a significant institutional actor throughout Detroit's municipal
bankruptcy, bearing little resemblance to the federalist model.
III. The Detroit Blueprint: Overlooked Avenues of Federal Court Involvement
A. Judicial Selection Process
An account of the court's role begins with a decision that necessarily
transpired before the first hearing-the selection of the bankruptcy judge. 20 In
federal courts, judges usually are assigned cases randomly within districts and
divisions.' 2' Chapter 9 contains a statutory exception that instructs the chief of
114. For the eligibility and plan confirmation trials-the most likely to fit a traditional
adversarial paradigm- relied more heavily on transcripts.
115. An oral argument relating to the rights of water and sewer bondholders was held
in the judge's chambers on July 17, 2014. In response to a UNC Law Library query, the court reported
that no recording would be released. A bus tour for the court on August 8, 2014, requested by the debtor
and opposed by some creditors, was part of the plan confirmation trial. Order Regarding Site Visit, In re
City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. June 27,2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 5629. A brief video excerpt
was released shortly after the tour, but a full written transcript was not filed on the docket until months
later, after the plan of adjustment went into effect. Notice of Filing Record of Site Visit, In re City of
Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8673. Judge Rhodes also held in-
courtroom interviews with finalists for the job of court-appointed feasibility expert on April 18, 2014.
Order Regarding the Solicitation of Applications to Serve as the Court's Expert Witness on the Issue of
Feasibility at 3, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. April 2, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 3610
(specifying interview date and procedure). A full recording was not released to the public.
116. Infra Part III.C.
117. Id.
118. Infra Part III.D.3.
119. The court performed traditional adversarial tasks, of course. The handling of
discrete disputes and evidentiary objections in the first few months of the case is documented in Jacoby,
Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, supra note 29, at 855-861.
120. By necessity, this section is based on a review of the docket of cases and traditional
research rather than on audio recordings of hearings.
121. A prominent exception arises for pre-trial management of multi-district litigation,
assigned to a specific judge by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Jaime Dodge, Facilitative
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the circuit court of appeals to select the j udge. 2 2 Concerns about judge capability
have dominated explanations for this provision. 23 Yet, as we will see, non-
random appointment also offers an opportunity for the bankruptcy, district, and
circuit courts to discuss a philosophy for, and collaborate on, management of the
case. 124
When the clerk of the bankruptcy court received Detroit's Chapter 9 filing,
she asked for a designation from the chief circuit judge) 25 Chief Judge Alice
Batchelder filed a notice of her selection. 6 Whereas notices in other Chapter 9
cases have merely identified the judge's name, 2 ' the Detroit designation is
substantive. In addition to confirming Judge Rhodes' availability (Judge Rhodes
deferred retiring from the bench to take the case), 128 Chief Judge Batchelder
wrote that the selection followed a review of the judges' "levels of experience
and the respective caseloads" in the Eastern District of Michigan, as well as of
judges' views.'2 9
Judging: Organizational Design in Mass-Multidistrict Litigation, 64 EMORY L.J. 329, 337 (2014)
("[A]lmost one-third of active district judges have a pending MDL assignment.").
122. 11 U.S.C. § 921 (b) (2012) ("The chiefjudge ofthe court of appeals for the circuit
embracing the district in which the case is commenced shall designate the bankruptcy judge to conduct
the case").
123. H.R. REP. No. 94-686, supra note 62, at 2 (stating purpose of maximizing
flexibility to account for volume of business); COLLIER, supra note 62, 1j 921.03 (citing S. REP. No. 94-
458, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975), for provision aiming to "insure that a municipal case would be
handled by a judge capable of doing so"); King, supra note 17, at 1165 ("[Tlhe Chief Judge of the
circuit ... has the opportunity to review the calendars of the particular judges and to make a selection
based on whatever criteria he deems important."); Knox & Levinson, supra note 17, at 10 ("[l]t is very
likely that a chapter 9 case will be assigned to one of the most qualified and experienced judges within
the applicable federal circuit."); David S. Kupetz, Municipal Debt Adjustment Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 27 URB. LAW. 531, 551-52 (1995). Cf Harry D. Dixon, Jr. & Joanne L. Manthe, Municipal
Adjustments, 1981 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 5 n.40 (1981) (attributing provision to concern about judges
"jockeying" for cases).
124. Infra text accompanying with notes 220-224.
125. Request for Designation of Bankruptcy Judge, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. July 19, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0035.
126. Designation of Bankruptcy Judge, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July
19, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0052.
127. Designation of Bankruptcy Judge, In re Adair Co. Hosp. Dist., No. 13-10939
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Aug. 1, 2013) (Sixth Circuit, no explanation); Order Designating Bankruptcy Judge
Christopher Klein to conduct the City of Stockton Case, In re City of Stockton, No. 12-32118 (June 29,
2012); Designation of Presiding Judge, In re Jefferson Cty., No. 11-5736 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2011);
Assignment of Bankruptcy Judge to Conduct a Case Under II U.S.C. § 921 (b), In re Hardeman Co. Hosp.
Dist., No. 13-70103 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2013); Designation of a Bankruptcy Judge to Preside
Over a Chapter 9 Case, In re Pauls Valley Hosp. Auth., No. 13-10791 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. Mar. 4, 2013);
In re City of San Bernardino, No. 12-28006 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jul. 31, 2012); In re Town of Mammoth
Lakes, No. 12-32463 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Jul. 3, 2012); In re Suffolk Reg'l Off-Track Betting Corp., No.
12-43503 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012); Order Designating Bankruptcy Judge, In re City of
Harrisburg, No. 11-06938 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2011); In re City of Vallejo, No. 08-26813 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. May 23, 2008).
128. Designation, supra note 126; David McLaughlin, Detroit Bankruptcy Judge is
Ponzi-Law Scholar, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 20, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.comnews/articles/2013-
07-20/detroit-bankruptcy-judge-rhodes-is-ponzi-law-scholar.
129. Designation, supra note 126.
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Chief Judge Batchelder appended a letter from the Chief Judge of the
Eastern District of Michigan, Gerald Rosen, who will figure prominently into the
bankruptcy as the lead mediator.1 3' Noting that he and Chief Judge Batchelder
had already spoken about Judge Rhodes taking the case, Chief Judge Rosen's
letter explained that Judge Rhodes was a consensus choice, and that he had
"outstanding administrative and case management skills, which of course will
be necessary in handling a case of this magnitude." '3 Chief Judge Rosen also
thanked Chief Judge Batchelder for her offer of resource support for the Detroit
bankruptcy. Apparently, the chiefjudges believed Detroit's bankruptcy required
considerably more than a traditional umpire of trials.' 32 Their explanations lack
any mention of federalism-based constraints.
B. Case Management
I had a reputation for moving my cases along and I think that the people
who were responsible for making the selection understood that reputation and
understood its need... in this case to be expedited and accelerated.1
33
Always be closing. 134
In early August 2013, Judge Rhodes emphasized the court's limited
responsibility in municipal bankruptcy, but expressed the intent "to facilitate, to
the extent possible, the consensual resolution of disputes" using "procedures of
judicial management."' 135 Detroit's dire circumstances made efficient resolution
"imperative and one that the Court intends to fulfill with the highest degree of
commitment."' 3 6
130. Infra Part III.C.
131. Designation, supra note 126 (emphasis added) (reporting the "wholehearted[]"
endorsement of a "large cross section" of the district court); Bomey et al., supra note 5, at Chapter 4:
Rosen's Son Asks "What Would Churchill Do?"("Rosen told colleagues he believed Rhodes had the
temperament and management skills to keep the monster case on track."). These attributes are consistent
with Judge Rhodes' prior service as a magistrate judge. Interview by WDET 101.9 FM with Judge Steven
Rhodes, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan (Feb. 17, 2015),
archives.wdet.org/shows/Detroit-today/episode/j udge-rhodes-post-bankruptcy-interview-02-17-15
(reviewing Judge Rhodes's non-bankruptcy experience).
132. A letter from the district's Chief Bankruptcy Judge, however, noted that Judge
Rhodes, who presided over the only Chapter 9 previously filed in the district, has expertise on the
relationship between bankruptcy and state constitutional law. Designation, supra note 126.
133. WDET interview, supra note 131(1:40).
134. Hon. Steven Rhodes, Am. Bankr. Inst. Spring Meeting Lunch Talk (Apr. 18,2015)
(citing GLENGARRY GLEN Ross (New Line Cinema 1992)) [hereinafter "ABI Spring Meeting Lunch
Talk"].
135. Transcript of Hearing Re. Status Conference, supra note 113, at 7-8 (explaining
that a judge plays a "very limited role ... in a municipal bankruptcy" and the primary role was to resolve
disputes, especially eligibility and confirmation); id at 9-10 (The Court has no role in "running the city"
or its services. "There is nothing the Court can do about any of these matters.... The city's officials are
not accountable to this Court for how they run the city.").
136. Id.
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The court followed through on these intentions-albeit with little help or
guidance from the Bankruptcy Code itself.137 Chapter 9 mentions only one,
optional deadline: the due date for the filing of a plan of adjustment. 3 8 Judge
Rhodes proposed an ambitious and detailed scheduling order. 139 Pursuant to the
terms of the order, the court would extend dates and deadlines only on a motion
establishing good cause.' 40 Extension requests thus served an information-
forcing function. 14' Although delays were inevitable, the case adhered
remarkably well to the court's initial scheduling order.
142
The court adopted multiple approaches to move the case. One was to
prevent parties from belaboring procedural matters. 43 Another was to strongly
encourage settlement. 144 Concerned that the city's progress might languish after
the bankruptcy, the court even proposed a continued monitoring role, 45 but
137. Judge Rhodes sometimes cited FED. R. Civ. P. 1, which calls for a "just, speedy,
and inexpensive" process for federal civil litigation. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which authorizes pretrial conferences and scheduling orders, applies only to adversary proceedings, FED.
R. BANKR. P. 7016, 9014(c), but section 105(d) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes case management.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 941. Setting a time "supplies the necessary incentives to both sides in
the negotiations to arrive at a mutually agreeable plan within a reasonable time." H.R. REP. No. 94-686,
supra note 62, at 11. Nonetheless, some judges defer setting even that date. Bill Rochelle & Sherri Toub,
San Bernardino Police Want Deadline for Filing Plan, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 7,2014 (reporting no plan filing
deadline two years into case).
139. First Order Establishing Dates and Deadlines at 1, In re City of Detroit (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0280 (proposing March 1, 2014 for plan filing);
Transcript of Hearing Re. Status Conference, supra note 113.
140. The standard reflects FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), which, as stated in note 137 does
not directly apply to the case as a whole, but also is not expressly prohibited. Later, the standard for
deferral requests increased to "extraordinary cause." Fifth Amended Order Establishing Procedures,
Deadlines, and Hearing Dates Relating to the Debtor's Plan of Adjustment at 4, In re City of Detroit
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. June 9, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 5259.
141. Cf Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 21, at 378 (noting how courts get
information earlier through case management).
142. The lead mediator, Chief Judge Rosen, wished the case had wrapped up in just a
year. Christine Ferretti & Chad Livengood, Rhodes: Pension Plans Too Costly for Cities, DET. NEWS,
Feb. 25, 2015 ("1 thought it would have had a nice symmetry to it because of the one-year anniversary");
Nathan Bomey, Kevyn Orr Defends Pension Moves in Detroit Bankruptcy, DET. FREE PRESS, Feb. 25,
2015 (same).
143. For example, creditors and insurers debated the details of the city's proposed
notice to creditors of the deadline to file claims. Perhaps sensing that these debates would postpone
finalization and circulation, the court established a process for finalizing the remaining details, noting, "I
don't want this held up. Do you hear me?" Hearing Re. Motion of Debtor at 49, In re City of Detroit
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 14,2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1771.
144. Transcript of In Re: Trial Re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 10, In re City of
Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2014) ECF No. 7894 (regarding dispute between the city and MIDDD,
court stating, "Well, if I can speak bluntly here... [t]his $26,000,000 claim ought to be settled");
Transcript of In re: Continued Trial Re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 3-4, In re City of Detroit (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Oct. 20,2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8031 (regarding matter involving UAW and treatment
of approximately 330 library employees, court saying, "I don't want an explanation, I want you to resolve
it .... I want you to resolve it now, go resolve it .... Go resolve it"). See also Transcript of In re: Trial
at 172, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 2014), ECF No. 7345 (telling Syncora's lawyer
that "1 want a percentage and I want it now" of the amount Syncora would have to be paid for Syncora to
agree the plan was confirmable).
145. Transcript on Hearing Re Wayne County's Motion for . . . Appointment of a
Facilitative Mediator at 182, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF
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dropped the idea once it was clear the State of Michigan would appoint an
oversight commission. 14 6
Judge Rhodes creatively managed portions of the case that were otherwise
difficult to reach, especially in light of section 904's proscriptions. For example,
after the city had declined the court's suggestion to establish a tort claimant
committee but had not yet made public an alternative plan, 147 Judge Rhodes used
a request to lift the automatic stay-a key protection of the debtor from
litigation-to achieve a broader oversight objective, illustrating that a court can
make a debtor act without entering the kind of orders identified in section 904.
The movant, Deborah Ryan, had asked the bankruptcy court to lift the stay
so she could continue her constitutional tort litigation in federal district court. 48
The litigation stemmed from tragic facts: Ryan's son-in-law had killed her
daughter and then himself, both Detroit police officers. The city defended against
the motion to lift the stay by arguing that the suit would be too distracting for
lawyers busy with the restructuring. Surprised by, and perhaps dubious of, the
city's assertion that the same lawyers worked on both, 4 9 Judge Rhodes called
for an evidentiary hearing to examine the workload of the city's in-house
lawyers. 150 Detroit called as its witness the city's deputy corporation counsel. 5'
Ryan's lawyer cross-examined. Just when the hearing seemed to be concluding,
Judge Rhodes called a witness of his own.'52 That witness was Michael Muller,
one of the city's in-house lawyers, who had been identified as present in the
No. 4209 ("[W]e have to think about what the appropriate role is for the Bankruptcy Court to monitor
implementation of the plan post-confirmation assuming there is an order of confirmation.").
146. Transcript on Trial Re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 148-50, In re City of
Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2014), ECF No. 7878 (emergency manager testifying
why monitor was eliminated from earlier version of plan).
147. Transcript of Hearing Re. Status Conference, supra note 113, at 117 (court noting
that a flood of motions for relief from stay is the "last thing any of us wants," and suggesting a tort claimant
committee); Transcript of Hearing Regarding Amended Motion of Creditor Ryan at 16, In re City of
Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1118 (re-raising question of tort
claims: "what's the plan?").
148. Motion of Creditor Deborah Ryan, An Interested Party, For Relief from This
Court's Order Staying Proceedings, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2013) (No. 13-
53846), ECF No. 0800 (seeking to lift the stay "for cause").
149. Transcript of Hearing Regarding Amended Motion of Creditor Deborah Ryan at
13-14, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1118.
150. Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing Regarding Amended Motion of Creditor
Deborah Ryan for Relief from this Court's Order Staying Proceedings, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Oct. 2, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1073 ("The Court concludes that the record is not adequate
with regard to the potential prejudice to the City if the motion is granted.").
151. Evidentiary Hearing Regarding Amended Motion of Creditor Deborah Ryan at
62-66, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 8, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1177.
152. A judge calling his or her own witness is rare but authorized under Federal Rule
of Evidence 614. FED. R. Ev. 614; WEiNSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 614.02[1] (2013) (describing
practice as "particularly desirable in bench trials or when the interest of others than the immediate parties
may be at stake, such as in class actions, or matters involving public policy"). Discussion of this rule in
bankruptcy court opinions is infrequent. But see Northeast Alliance Fed. Credit Union v. Garcia, 260 B.R.
622, 628-30 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2011) (court calling debtors' former lawyer regarding omissions on
bankruptcy schedules); In re Michelson, 141 B.R. 715, 722 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992) (discussing right of
judge to call own witness but not doing so).
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courtroom earlier that day.153 Muller was responsible for the city's defense to
Ryan's lawsuit. When Judge Rhodes asked Muller what he was doing with his
time, 54 the latter's answer boiled down to "not much."' 55
Judge Rhodes ruled he would lift the stay to allow Ryan to proceed if
Detroit failed to make substantial progress on a comprehensive plan for all tort
claims in thirty-five days. 15 6 Strictly speaking, the court did not order the city to
develop a plan. But if the city did nothing, and the stay was lifted, the city would
have to contend with not only the Ryan litigation, but hundreds of other plaintiffs
wanting similar opportunities. 15 7 As if on cue, Detroit filed its tort plan. 5 8
As this example suggests, the court was willing to use inquisitorial
techniques (here, calling the court's own witness) to keep the case moving and
under control. Judge Rhodes also selected a court-appointed expert, which is
itself an inquisitorial technique, to evaluate the feasibility of Detroit's ultimate
restructuring plan:
The Court will not permit the confirmation of the city's plan to be another bad
deal like all the previous ones the city entered into with which we are now all too
familiar.... 159
153. Evidentiary Hearing, supra note 151, at 47 (court indicating that he would like to
call Muller and beginning direct examination).
154. Id. at 49 ("So I feel compelled to ask you how are you spending your time these
days?").
155. Id. Although the city's in-house legal department apparently had been preparing
a plan, Muller did not so indicate.
156. Evidentiary Hearing, supra note 151, at 63-64. An extension was possible, but the
standard for obtaining one was high. Id. at 64. The court left it to the discretion of the city to develop a
process and reminded the city of the possibility of a tort claims committee. Id. at 65.
157. Understanding the dynamics, Ryan's lawyer told the press that the court "basically
used our motion as a vehicle to push the city a bit harder to come up with a [tort claimant] plan and
liquidate these outstanding claims against the city." Tresa Baldas, Detroit Bankruptcy Judge Gives City
35 Days to Develop Plan to Clear Lawsuits, DET. FREE PRESS, Oct. 8, 2013.
158. Motion of Debtor, Pursuant to Sections 105 and 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, for
Entry of an Order Approving Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures to Promote the Liquidation of
Certain Prepetition Claims, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF
No. 1665 (setting forth claim exchange procedure, plus arbitration). After filing its tort claimant plan, the
city agreed to let Ryan proceed in district court. Stipulation for an Order Resolving Motion of Creditor
Deborah Ryan, An Instant Party, For Relief from this Court's Order Staying Proceedings, In re City of
Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2568. But the dispute had already
served its function for the court.
159. Transcript on Motion of Creditors for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Section 105(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code... to Establish a Benchmark Valuation at 38, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Jan. 22, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2562. At a later hearing, the court explained that creditors
were unlikely to provide an adequate adversarial presentation on feasibility, justifying the appointment.
Transcript of Hearing Regarding Notice of Presentment of Order at 17, In re City of Detroit, (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. April 2, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 3817; FED. R. Ev. 706, Advisory Committee Notes on
Proposed Rules (1975) ("[T]he availability of the procedure in itself decreases the need for resorting to it"
due to its "sobering effect on other witnesses and parties."); Erichson, supra note 90, at 1987-88
(discussing relative infrequency of court-appointed experts but increasing use in mass tort cases after the
Supreme Court's Daubert decision). See also Reporter's Daily Transcript of Proceedings at 177, In re
City of Stockton, No. 12-32118-C-9 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) ("When I decide ... whether to
confirm the plan, I need to think about what are the alternatives. Otherwise, I'd just mindlessly be rubber-
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Now is not the time for defiant swagger or for dismissive pound-the-table, take-
it-or-leave-it proposals that are nothing but a one-way ticket to Chapter 18 .... If
the plan ... promises more to creditors than the city can reasonably be expected
to pay, it will fail, and history will judge each and every one of us accordingly. 160
The judge conducted the direct examination of his expert himself. 1 61
More generally, Judge Rhodes took an active, affirmative questioning role,
gathering and clarifying information as well as conveying his preferences. The
August 21, 2013 hearings, early in the case, offer examples that reflect, and
perhaps set, the tone and expectations. In the morning, creditors complained
about barriers to access to Detroit's financial data room, such as nondisclosure
agreements and legal releases. 62 When Detroit responded with a reference to
"sensitive financial documents," the judge asked Detroit's lawyers why every
piece of paper that is not privileged shouldn't be discoverable in a bankruptcy
case. 163 When the court asked the lawyer for examples of "competitively
sensitive" information, and the lawyer identified cash projections, the court
challenged that response, and asked why it wouldn't be in the city's best interest
to share them with the public. After the lawyer's response, the judge paused the
inquiry and instructed the lawyer to confer with his colleagues and client and
return with an answer at 3 p.m."64 At the appointed time, the lawyer reported
Detroit would lift the restrictions to an even greater extent than creditors had
requested. 165
An afternoon hearing on August 21, 2013 on a time-sensitive issue,
scheduled that morning at the court's encouragement, 166 focused on Detroit's
rights in casino revenues. Judge Rhodes asked detailed questions throughout the
movant's presentation, exhausting the bankruptcy knowledge of the bond
stamping a plan. You might as well hire a potted palm to preside in the courtroom."); Jacoby, What Should
Judges Do in Chapter II?, supra note 29 at 585 (discussing divergent views on whether courts have a
duty to scrutinize plan feasibility and how that duty is fulfilled).
160. Transcript on Motion of Creditors, supra note 159, at 39-40. A Chapter 18 is a
reference to a second Chapter 9 filing.
161. Transcript of Hearing Regarding Status Conference at 12, In re City of Detroit
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 6585 (asking for objections; none heard);
Transcript of Continued Trial at 137-186, In re City of Detroit, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2014) (No.
13-53846), ECF No. 7617 (court leading Daubert examination of Kopacz); Transcript of In Re Continued
Trial at 8-84, In re City of Detroit, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8082
(court leading direct examination of Kopacz).
162. Transcript of Hearing Regarding Emergency Motion for Clarification at 44-45, In
re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0685.
163. Id. at 52 ("Give me an example of a document that parties can see, but you don't
want disseminated, whatever that means.").
164. Id. at 53-54 ("This is bankruptcy. What's not relevant? All right. I'm going to-
I'm going to just pause this inquiry now because I sense the need for it.").
165. Id. at 56-57; Order Granting Motion of Debtor for a Protective Order, In re City
of Detroit, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2013) (No. 13-53486), ECF No. 0685 ("All interested parties shall
have unrestricted access to the data room.").
166. Transcript of Hearing Regarding Emergency Motion, supra note 162, at 33-34.
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insurer's lawyer by his own admission.' 67 Although the city's lawyer was
capable of rebutting the creditor's arguments, the court did much of that work
itself.16 Active engagement, and a two-way flow of information, were typical
throughout status conferences and hearings.
The court's involvement varied during big evidentiary trials, and sometimes
went beyond asking clarifying questions and resolving evidentiary disputes.1
69
During the plan confirmation trial, the judge asked detailed substantive questions
of a variety of witnesses, including City Council President Brenda Jones,
170
Mayor Mike Duggan, 17 ' Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr, 72 the Director/Chief
Executive Officer of Detroit's water and sewerage department, 73 the Chief
Operating Officer of the Detroit Institute of Arts, 174 investment banker Ken
167. Id. at 76-93 (back and forth between court and Syncora's lawyer); id. at 92-93
("Your Honor, I have said my piece. I think we-may have exhausted my knowledge of-bankruptcy law
as well."); id. at 105 ("Just to the extent there was any failing in my presentation today to respond to some
of your questions, I wanted you to know that we would be happy to submit additional pleadings ....
[Tlhere were some questions you posed that if you'd like more, we'd be happy to prepare.").
168. The city prevailed. Excerpt of Hearing Re. Opinion Re. Stay Issue, In re City of
Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0692; Order Regarding Casino
Revenues and Automatic Stay, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 13-53846),
ECF No. 0670. The district court affirmed. Opinion and Order, In re City of Detroit, (E.D. Mich. July 11,
2014) (No. 2:13-cv-14305), ECF No. 14.
169. As just one example illustrating the frequent resolution of evidentiary disputes,
see Transcript of Re: Evidentiary Trial, In re City ofDetroit, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2013) (No. 13-
53846), ECF No. 1490. The court sometimes raised evidentiary objections sua sponte. Transcript of
Continued Trial Re: Confirmation of Chapter 9 Plan at 247-5 1, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
Sept. 16, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7618 (court and Wagner debating at some length the relevance
of Wagner's questions to Kim Nicholl; no input from retiree committee lawyer or city). Later, as the court
explains the problem with the answer the witness just gave, Wagner jokes that he will let the court finish
the cross-examination. id. at 261. See also Transcript of Trial Re. Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, supra
note 7, at 57-58 (court raising and sustaining its own objection).
170. Transcript of Trial Re. Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, supra note 7, at 58-59 (court
asking City Council President whether she is committed to carrying out the plan and whether art should
be sold or preserved for the city).
171. Transcript of In re: Continued Trial at 144-149, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7917.
172. Transcript of In Re: Trial Re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, supra note 144, at 15-
28; Trial Re. Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 131-136, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich Oct. 21
2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8098.
173. Transcript of Trial Re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 127-138, In re City of
Detroit, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 17, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7638. The questions included open-
ended queries, such as whether the creation of a regional water authority would be a positive development,
id. at 130-31, 137, and challenges she foresaw in the next ten years, id. at 131. Judge Rhodes also asked,
"I'm going to speak perhaps a little more bluntly.... Is it fair to say, in your estimation, that certain
customers, communities, and others carried a certain amount of distrust or lack of confidence or skepticism
about the department's ability to carry out its mission in the most efficient way?" Id. at 135.
174. Transcript of Continued Trial Re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 156, In re City
of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7634.
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Buckfire, 75 Ernst and Young managing director Guarav Malhotra, 76 Michael
Plummer from ArtVest,177 and a water and sewer system consultant.1
78
While Judge Rhodes often expected precise answers to his questions, he
sometimes afforded witnesses significant latitude. The exchange with the DIA's
Chief Operating Officer Annmarie Erickson offers an example. 79 Judge Rhodes
asked Erickson, "[w]hat is your opinion on what the value of the museum is to
the 60,000 school children you said comes [sic] there,"' 80 and then, "[w]hat is
the value to the children of participating in the programming that the museum
offers apart fromjust the opportunity to see the art?"' 8' Erickson talked generally
about the importance of the museum for families with school age children, 82 for
adults, 183 and to the city and region as a whole.' 84 The court credited that
testimony in its written decision confirming the plan.' 85
175. Transcript of Trial Re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 54-59, 79-80, In re City of
Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7821; id. at 94 (asking witness to
think during recess about advantages and disadvantages of deferring exit financing for six months or a
year); id. at 115-17, 211-223 (asking, among other things, about cost associated with granting security
interest in income tax revenues).
176. Transcript of Trial re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 59, 69, 78-79, 80-85, In re
City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 21,2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8098.
177. Transcript of In re: Continued Trial at 64-66, In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147
(Bankr. E.D. Mich Sept. 18, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7634.
178. Transcript of Trial Re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 32-35, In re City of Detroit
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7821. The court's questions to three
witnesses about public pension practices and discount rates prompted witness re-examination by objecting
creditors (who later settled). Transcript of Continued Trial Re: Confirmation of Chapter 9 Plan at 50-57,
In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7618 (testimony of
Alan Perry in response to court questions); id. at 54 (court asking "[ils the industry doing anything about
re-examining its standard practices in-in setting investment return assumptions to deal with this very
large as you characterized it, UAAL?"); id. at 56 ("Do you have an opinion on whether the 6.75%
investment return assumption in this case is prudent?"); id. at 57 ("Are you telling me that given Detroit's
insolvency your-your view might be that prudence would suggest an even lower rate?"); id. at 57-58
(objector re-cross examination); Transcript of Trial Re. Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, supra note 7, at 234-
37 (testimony of Cynthia Thomas in response to court questions); id. at 237 (objector redirect
examination); Transcript of In re Continued Trial at 125-134, 136-38, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Oct 14, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8004 (testimony of William Fomia in response to court
questions); id. at 134-135 (objector redirect examination).
179. Transcript of Continued Trial Re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 156-57, In re
City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 18,2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7634 (starting with disclosure
that Erickson had shown Judge Rhodes the museum as part of the city tour, but they had not otherwise
talked about the museum).
180. Id. at 157. The court specified that his reference to value included non-economic
value.
181. Id. at 158.
182. Id. at 159-160.
183. Id. at 161.
184. Id. at 161-164.
185. In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at 218 ("[The court] also accepts the testimony
of Ms. Erickson on the priceless value that the DIA and the art create for the City, the region and the
state ... . The evidence unequivocally establishes that the DIA stands at the center of the City as an
invaluable beacon of culture, education for both children and adults, personal journey, creative outlet,
family experience, worldwide visitor attraction, civic pride and energy, neighborhood and community
cohesion, regional cooperation, social service, and economic development. Every great city in the world
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These various examples reflect that the presiding judge was not a passive
bystander waiting to be invited into the case. From the outset, Judge Rhodes set
the pace of the case and aimed to prevent its derailment. He was an active
participant, with deep substantive engagement, at the micro and macro levels.
1 86
The impact of this involvement cannot be measured by standard metrics such as
written court decisions.
C. Dealmaking
I felt it was necessary to appoint the strongest possible mediator that I
could. And lfelt that ChiefJudge Rosen had all of the necessary qualities. Weight
of office. Weight of personality. Commitment to the city. Personal and
professional contacts. Political contacts. He was the right person. 187
Settlement promotion, when overseen by a judge, can chip away at the
federalist core of municipal bankruptcy. Just a few days after Detroit filed for
bankruptcy, Judge Rhodes proposed a mediation process, and raised the matter
at the second hearing. 188 Litigation could be "bitter" and "expensive," he
explained, while settlements could stabilize and strengthen long-term
relationships. 189 Judge Rhodes's proposed order identified Chief Judge Rosen as
his choice for lead mediator.190 By appointing a chief districtjudge as a mediator,
actively pursues these values. They are the values that Detroit must pursue to uplift, inspire and enrich its
residents and its visitors.").
186. The court, rather than the debtor or a moving party, almost always proposed the
order in which to address the scheduled items. By comparison, in the Jefferson County bankruptcy, the
debtor filed detailed agendas for hearings that included the order of agenda items. Jefferson County's
Agenda for Hearing Scheduled for May 9, 2013, In re Jefferson Cty. (Bankr. N.D. Ala. May 7, 2013) (No.
11-05736), ECF No. 1766; Jefferson County's Agenda for Hearing Scheduled for November 15, 2012, In
re Jefferson Cty. (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Nov. 13, 2012) (No. 11-05736), ECF No. 1420; Jefferson County's
Amended Agenda for Hearing Scheduled for November 15, 2012, In re Jefferson Cty. (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
Nov. 14, 2012) (No. 11-05736), ECF No. 1423; Jefferson County's Agenda for Hearing Scheduled for
April 16, 2012 at 9:00AM, In re Jefferson Cty. (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 2012) (No. 11-05736), ECF
No. 0905; Jefferson County's Agenda for Hearing Scheduled for November 21, 2011 at 8:00AM, In re
Jefferson Cty. (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2011) (No. 11-05736), ECF No. 0231.
187. Nathan Bomey, Q&A: Detroit Bankruptcy Judge on Pensions, DIA, Fees, DET.
FREE PRESS, Feb. 20, 2015.
188. Transcript of Hearing Re. Status Conference, supra note 113, at 8.
189. Id. at 44. That view was expressed throughout the case. E.g., Order Granting the
City's Motion to Vacate the Appointment of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors at 11, In re
City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2784 ("As this Court has
emphasized, litigation is costly and time-consuming, and most often its results are that the winner takes
all and the loser gets nothing.").
190. Order Establishing Amended Initial Status Conference Agenda at 4, In re City of
Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich., July 23, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0129 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105 and
stating that "it is necessary and appropriate to order the parties to engage in the facilitative mediation of
any matters that the Court refers in this case"); Order Regarding Comment Period on Revised Mediation
Order, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich., Aug. 2, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0278 (amended
proposed order with request for comments). The amended version refers to consultation with the parties
before ordering mediation of particular matters. As noted in note 197, that consultation process, if it
occurred, is not apparent from the public record.
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the bankruptcy judge arguably delegates more power to the mediator than the
bankruptcy judge could have exercised himself. 9' Had the parties selected one
or more mediators from a private panel as local rules generally anticipate,
mediation might not have become the relatively unchecked avenue for strong
federal control for which Detroit will be remembered.
Judge Rhodes presented mediation to the parties as a proposal. His order
required, however, that party comments be delivered to the court in sealed
envelopes and not filed on the public docket. 192 In open court, a lawyer for the
city expressed support for the court's order as written. 193 A lawyer for a union
also indicated acceptance, although not to the exclusion of other avenues to
protect her client's interest. 94 The Detroit Retirement Systems' lawyer
suggested the most unease, characterizing the proposal as premature. 95 In
response, Judge Rhodes emphasized the facilitative nature of the process;
nothing, and no one, would be coerced, he said.' 96After the comment period,
Judge Rhodes named Chief Judge Rosen the lead mediator and authorized him
to "enter any order necessary for the facilitation of mediation proceedings" on
191. A bankruptcy court, comprising merit-selected non-Article II judges, is a unit of
the district court. Also, the district court is generally the first court to hear an appeal from a bankruptcy
court order (although one presumes such appeals would not go to a judge assigned as mediator). Church,
supra note 12 (business school professor stating that Chief Judge Rosen was "a second judge who can do
things the first judge can't").
192. Order Regarding Comment Period, supra note 190, at I ("Interested parties may
submit comments regarding the attached Proposed Revised Mediation Order as well as comments
regarding a proposed Mediator directly to Judge Rhodes in care of the Bankruptcy Clerk's office by
August 9,2013. Comments should be sealed in an envelope and labeled 'CONFIDENTIAL MEDIATION
ORDER COMMENTS.' Comments should not be filed through CM/ECF."); Transcript of Hearing
Regarding Status Conference, supra note 188, at 45-46 ("1 want to solicit the comments of others regarding
the concept of mediation and the particulars of the order. It's probably not, however, appropriate to seek
your comments in this forum regarding the proposed mediator, and so I am going to ask you if you have
any comments, either-on either side of the question about the proposed mediator, I'm going to give you
a seven-day opportunity to submit to my chambers sealed and confidentially any such comments.").
193. Transcript of Hearing Regarding Status Conference, supra note 188, at 45
("Obviously you articulated better than I could possibly why we support mediation. We want resolution.
We don't want protracted litigation. We want to move swiftly. Time is our enemy, as I said .... With
respect to the order, which is your second question, we have no desire to change any of the language
presented in the order as you've stated it.").
194. Id. at 46-47 (also expressing preference for a "full-service mediator that can help
us with process issues as well as substance issues").
195. Id. at 51-52. The lawyer asked that parties have the chance to engage in
negotiations to narrow the issues and gather more information before being sent to mediation. "We want
to caution against expediency merely for the sake of expediency. We all have a sense of urgency. How
could we not? But there is proceeding with all due dispatch, and then there's proceeding in haste and
endangering parties' due process rights." Id.
196. Id. at 53-54 ("[P]lease understand what I'm referring to here and what I envision
here is entirely facilitative mediation. There's nothing that this mediator will have the authority to do in
terms of compelling any particular outcome .... The ultimate deliverable is a plan, assuming we get past
eligiblity .... And in that regard, there may be other disputes that should be better referred to a mediation
panel than to the mediator who is working on debt adjustment, and I think we want to keep that option
open also.").
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major issues, and to appoint other mediators at his discretion. 197 The order also
rendered confidential "all proceedings, discussions, negotiation, and writings
incident to mediation."'
98
The first mediation session occurred on September 17, 2013.199 Speaking
in his courtroom before the confidential portion began, Chief Judge Rosen
reiterated the virtues of settlement: "years of litigation, disputing issues in the
courts, is horrendous.""2 ' By about two months into the bankruptcy, dozens of
creditor groups or representatives, including the State of Michigan and
Michigan's Attorney General, had been sent to mediation on almost everything
of significance in the case.20 1 The numbers of parties in mediation or alternative
dispute resolution grew with the addition of hundreds of tort claimants, 2
°2
counties negotiating a regional water authority,20 3 and parties seeking to enjoin
residential water shutoffs. 2 14 Mediation continued even long after the court
confirmed the city's plan of adjustment. 2 5 When Detroit's emergency manager
was asked at the plan confirmation hearing which issues the court had sent to
197. Mediation Order, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich., Aug. 13, 2013) (No.
13-53846), ECF No. 0322. The order refers to consultation with the parties before matters are sent to
mediation, but, for nearly all mediation orders that followed, I have found no evidence that such
consultation occurred.
198. Id. at 1 el. 4.
199. First Order Referring Matters to Facilitative Mediation, In re City of Detroit
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0333; see also Order to Certain Parties to
Appear for Mediation of Certain Disputes Before Special Mediator U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth
Perris, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0593.
200. Ed White, Associated Press, Judge Acting as Mediator in Detroit Bankruptcy:
Deals are Better than 'Horrendous 'Litigation, STAR TRIBUNE, Sept. 17, 2013; Robert Snell, Mediator
Tells City Creditors: "Open Your Minds"; Team of Judges Will Try to Settle Disputes Over Debt
Restructuring, DET. NEWS, Sept. 18, 2013, at Al. He also shared that he and the other mediators he had
appointed had taken a bus tour of the "good, the bad, and the ugly" of the city. White, supra note 200.
Chief Judge Rosen cited the perils of litigation at other junctures. Howes et al., supra note 12, at Ch. 4
(Chief Judge Rosen warned Grand Bargain funders that litigation would be devastating to the city).
201. First Order Referring Matters to Facilitative Mediation, supra note 199; Second
Order Referring Matters to Facilitative Mediation, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug 22, 2013)
(No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0562; Order to Certain Parties, supra note 199; Third Order Referring Matters
to Facilitative Mediation, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No.
1101 (listing twenty unions whose disputes would be referred to Chief Judge Rosen).
202. Order, Pursuant to Sections 105 and 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, Approving
Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures to Promote the Liquidation of Certain Prepetition Claims, In
re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2302; Alternative Dispute
Resolution Notice, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. June 30,2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 5681
(directing recipient's tort claim to be submitted to ADR and dividing costs).
203. Order of Referral to Mediation, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 17,
2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 4156 (entering an order broader than Wayne County requested).
204. Mediation Order, Lyda v. City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2014) (No.
14-04732), ECF No. 34 (referring matter to Chief Bankruptcy Judge Shefferly, not officially part of Chief
Judge Rosen's mediation team).
205. After ruling that plan confirmation required a review of all professional fees, even
if already paid, Judge Rhodes sent that process to Chief Judge Rosen. Oral Opinion on the Record at 27,
supra note 5. Judge Rhodes also sent to mediation post-bankruptcy matters relating to the establishment
of a regional water authority. Mediation Order, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2014)
(No. 14-53846), ECF No. 8468; Mediation Confidentiality Order, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
Feb. 6, 2015) (No. 14-53846), ECF No. 9176 (lease negotiations relating to water authority).
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mediation, he replied, "[a]ll of them." 20 6 Again, there is no sign that consent was
specifically elicited for each matter. The mediation process may also have re-
incorporated the presiding judge. For example, the press reported that a district
judge mediator asked Judge Rhodes to meet with union representatives to explain
bankruptcy law and their rights. 20
7
Chief Judge Rosen regularly entered orders on the bankruptcy court docket
even though he was not the presiding judge assigned to the case. Some
memorialized agreements between parties or sent tort claimants into a separate
arbitration process. 208 Most directed parties to attend mediation sessions,
20 9
including some calling for continual attendance until released by the mediator. 210
In a deposition, Detroit's emergency manager reported that Chief Judge Rosen
told him that he would hold an interest-rate-swap counterparty in contempt if it
did not accept a particular settlement.2 1'
Wearing his Detroit mediator hat (while also presiding over cases on his
own docket), Chief Judge Rosen was in direct communication with individuals
outside of the official sessions. Several news stories reported that Chief Judge
Rosen called the Emergency Manager over a weekend to urge him to cancel a
planned pension freeze that was rattling the parties. 212 Judge Rosen later quipped
at a press conference that he and Detroit's emergency manager probably talk to
each other more than to their wives.2 13 In addition, Chief Judge Rosen actively
solicited donations from private foundations, not originally parties to the
206. Transcript of In re Trial: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, supra note 2, at 169.
207. Howes et al., supra note 12, at Ch. 4 ("Could she invite Judge Rhodes to meet
privately with union leaders to provide a primer on Chapter 9 and his powers, answering questions and
concerns? The city agreed, mindful that continued delay benefited no one. On April 16, Rhodes walked
into the judges conference room on the seventh floor. For two hours, Roberts confirmed, he described
Chapter 9, quashing any notion that he could excise individual labor contracts from a restructuring plan
he might otherwise confirm. It helped.").
208. E.g., Order Regarding Provision of Actuarial Data, In re City of Detroit (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 3959 (setting forth terms by which Retiree
Committee's actuary will provide data to Detroit Retirement Systems).
209. Jacoby & Remus, supra note 30, contains a comprehensive list.
210. Order for Continuing Mediation, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept.
11, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7419 (ordering mediation for 11 parties "continuing day-to-day
thereafter as deemed necessary, until released by the mediators").
211. Deposition of Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr at 41, Dec. 31, 2013 ("We again
asked if it was possible to get to 155 [million], the mediators told us, 'No, 165 is the number. That's the
best number you're going to get today and I'm going to hold them in contempt if they don't agree to it."'),
available at https://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/O/docs/EM/Reports/OrrDepositionl23113.pdf.
212. Matt Helms, Orr Issues Stay on Freezing Pensions for Detroit Workers as
Mediation Continues, DET. FREE PRESS, Jan. 6, 2014 (quoting spokesperson for Emergency Manager
Kevyn Orr as saying "Judge Rosen asked Kevyn [Orr]-I think they had a long conversation over the
weekend-and Rosen asked if he would consider staying it"); Christine Ferretti, Pension Officials
Frustrated with Lack of Communication from Detroit EM over Freeze, DET. NEWS, Jan. 8, 2014 ("Chief
U.S. District Court Judge Gerald Rosen, who is mediating Detroit bankruptcy talks, urged Orr over the
weekend to halt the benefit freeze to allow for a possible debt-cutting deal with pensioners, Orr
spokesman... has said.").
213. Jonathan Oosting, Snyder Hails "Historic Day for Michigan 's Future, "' Urges
Detroit's Retirees to Approve Bankruptcy Plans, MICH. LIVE (June 3, 2014, 10:02 AM),
http://www.mlive.com/lansing-news/index.ssf/2014/06/snyder-hails-historic dayfor.html.
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bankruptcy, for what became the Grand Bargain. 214 Chief Judge Rosen also
reached out to the Michigan Governor and members of the state legislature to
seek financial contributions for the restructuring. 215  These contributions
materialized after legislative sessions in Lansing for which Chief Judge Rosen
was on hand.216 He held meetings in his chambers with Michigan House and
Senate majority leaders. 217 Local reporters spotted Chief Judge Rosen heading
into a closed-door Detroit City Council meeting, apparently to advocate for a
continued role for the emergency manager. 21 1 Chief Judge Rosen hosted
Michigan Governor Snyder and other politicians in his chambers to listen while
Judge Rhodes announced his decision confirming Detroit's plan.
2 19
The lead mediator also played a distinctive role in the appellate process,
illustrating just how many ways federal court influence can operate. When
objectors sought expedited review directly from the Sixth Circuit of the order
finding Detroit eligible for bankruptcy, Judge Rhodes asked the Circuit to confer
with Chief Judge Rosen on the timing of the appeal: "the Court remains
214. Bomey et al., supra note 5, at Ch. 11: After Tough Persuasion, Lansing Commits
to Grand Bargain; John Gallagher & Mark Stryker, Foundation Leaders, Detroit Bankruptcy Mediator
Meet Behind Closed Doors, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 6, 2013; Howes et al., supra note 12, at Ch. 4
(foundation leader recalling Chief Judge Rosen telling her, "I need a lot of money fast"); Mark Stryker &
John Gallagher, DIA Joins Deal in Works with Mediators that Would Protect Art, Pensions in Detroit
Bankruptcy, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 11,2013 ("DIA leaders said they had pledged at a Tuesday meeting
with mediators, including U.S. ChiefJudge Gerald Rosen ... to help refine the proposal that Rosen has
been pushing behind closed doors since November .... Rosen has been lobbying leaders of at least 10
foundations.").
215. Howes, Livengood & Shepardson, supra note 12, at Introduction ("I think we'll
get $350 [million] and I think you should match it," Chief Judge Rosen said to Governor Snyder); Steven
Church & Chris Christoff, Michigan Republicans in Talks with Detroit Mediator, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Jan. 16,2014,4:01 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01 - 15/michigan-republicans-in-talks-
with-detroit-mediator.
216. Church, supra note 12 ("Rosen also met with Michigan lawmakers about the deal.
The agreement required the Legislature's approval because the state was required to contribute $195
million."); Kathleen Gray, Michigan Senate OKs Historic $195M Detroit Aid Package; Snyder's
Signature Next, DET. FREE PRESS (June 4, 2014) ("U.S. District Judge Gerald Rosen, the chief federal
negotiator on the bankruptcy case, met with senators Tuesday morning and stayed to witness the bills
passage."), http://archive.freep.com/article/20140603/NEWS06/306030043/Detroit-bankruptcy-
pensions-artwork; Press Conference (June 9, 2014) ("Big Three" Automaker contribution, transcript on
file with author) (Rosen: "I was up there as I think some of you know last week when the legislation was
passed and it was just remarkable... ").
217. Howes et al., supra note 12, at Ch. 7.
218. Joe Guillen, Duggan, Council Meet on Orr 's Fate as Emergency Manager, DET.
FREE PRESS (Sept. 23, 2014) ("Rosen... seen walking into the Detroit City Council Chambers, where a
closed council session started at 2pm. Rosen oversees private mediation talks in the city's bankruptcy
case. He helped fashion the so-called 'grand bargain.' His involvement in this afternoon's private meeting
makes clear the interconnection between the city's ongoing bankruptcy case and the talks to oust Orr."),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/localldetroit-bankruptcy/2014/09/23/duggan-council-
meeting/l 6113167/; Darren A. Nichols, City Leaders Meet to Discuss Orr's Future in Detroit, DET. NEWS
(Sept. 25, 2014) (referring to Chief Judge Rosen's presence),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/locaUdetroit-bankruptcy/2014/09/23/duggan-council-
meeting/16113167/.
219. Bomey et al., supra note 5 ("Cheers and applause broke out down the hallway in
Rosen's stately chambers, where he and a large reception of dignitaries, including Gov. Snyder, Sen.
Majority Leader Richardville and others watched the ruling on closed circuit TV.").
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convinced that the interests of the City, its residents and its creditors are better
served by adjusting the pace of the legal process, including the appeals, to meet
the needs of the mediation process."220 The assigned panel of Sixth Circuitjudges
agreed to do just that.221 The districtjudge who received appeals also stayed them
sua sponte pending the Sixth Circuit's review of Detroit's eligibility on direct
appeal, which, as just noted, was largely suspended.222 Eventually, a creditor
(successfully) filed a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to hear and
decide an appeal. 223 And, by the summer of 2014, the Sixth Circuit threatened to
push forward with the eligibility appeal before plan confirmation. 224 But overall,
the strategy prevailed.
Although parties were barred from discussing negotiations by the mediation
order (and stern admonitions about that order), the lead mediator communicated
with the media and public through several channels. Written statements from the
"Detroit Bankruptcy Mediators" were issued by the district court's press officer
on the state of negotiations, significant contributions to the Grand Bargain, or
settlements.225 Chief Judge Rosen appeared and spoke at press conferences
alongside the Governor, members of the state legislature, the emergency
manager, Mayor Duggan, and others.
2 26
220. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 200 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) ("The Court
recommends that similarly, the Court of Appeals . . . consult with Chief Judge Rosen on whether
expediting these appeals will facilitate or impede the mediation, and be guided accordingly.").
221. Letter from Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk to Counsel Re: City of Detroit Michigan,
Petition for Permission to Appeal, City of Detroit, 13-116, 13-118, 14-101/102/103/104/105 (6th Cir. Feb.
7, 2014) ("1 advise you that [the panel] will consult with the Honorable Gerald Rosen in his capacity as
Judicial Mediator for the underlying bankruptcy.").
222. In re Syncora Guarantee Inc., 757 F.3d 511, 514-15 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussing
how district court allowed appeal to languish from November 2013, when it was fully briefed, until April
2014, when the district court formally suspended the appeal pending the eligibility determination).
223. Id. at 516 ("[T]he prospect that a panel of this court may declare the city to be
ineligible for the protections of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code is no reason to stay other appeals that
present independent questions of law .... judicial resources are not so scarce as to justify the risks that
arise from the stay .... We must intervene to protect our appellate jurisdiction and to ensure that the
district court does not deprive Syncora of its statutory right to judicial review."); id. at 517 ("The question
presented in Syncora's appeal . . . is precisely the type of issue that should be reviewed before the
bankruptcy court confirms the plan of adjustment."). A concurring opinion emphasized that "governing
case law" necessitated the mandamus order. Id. at 517-18. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's judgment in favor of the city; the parties argued the matter before the Sixth Circuit, but settled,
and the Sixth Circuit did not rule.
224. Letter from Hon. Julia Smith Gibbons, In re City of Detroit, No. 14-1208 et al.
(6th Cir. July 29, 2014) (expressing reservation about postponing oral argument, suggesting court might
have to decide the matter without oral argument or argument via telephone, but canvassing appellants to
submit position on what to do with appeal by July 31, 2014, even though "panel does not consider further
delay in rendering a decision an option at this time").
225. Jacoby & Remus, supra note 30, contains a list of press releases.
226. Id., supra note 30, contains description and analysis. At the June 3, 2014 press
conference, after the state legislature had approved the Grand Bargain funding, Chief Judge Rosen
recognized it was unusual for judges to meet with the media, but said he was making an exception because
the matter was so important. Press Conference, supra note 213, at approximately 10:00 into video.
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Judge Rhodes was not a rubber stamp for settlements reached in
mediation.227 Indeed, the court rejected the first deal openly endorsed by Chief
Judge Rosen,228 although he sent the parties right back to mediation. 2 9 Overall,
though, the court's support for the court-supervised deal-making could hardly
have been stronger. In granting the city's request to dissolve the creditor's
committee, an atypical and controversial step in any bankruptcy, the court listed
the committee's insufficient enthusiasm for mediation as one of two reasons for
doing so. 2 30 Whenever news emerged of settlements, the court encouraged non-
settling creditors to follow suit.231 Concern about angering or disappointing
Chief Judge Rosen prodded parties back into negotiations.232 When a lawyer
suggested that the court had assigned Chief Judge Rosen to "crack heads," the
227. Transcript of Motion of Creditors at 4, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
Jan. 22, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2562 ("Well, in case you haven't noticed, I don't do faits
accomplis.").
228. On December 24, Chief Judge Rosen announced that the parties had agreed on a
new interest rate swap termination price. Chief Judge Rosen called the parties into a courtroom, where a
court reporter transcribed the settlement. Transcript of Settlement Between Debtor and Swap Counter
Parties at 9, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2013) (No. 13-53846). Reporters were
understandably unclear about the procedure, referring to a "settlement hearing." Joe Guillen, City of
Detroit, Banks Reach New Settlement in 2005 Financial Deal, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 24, 2013. Chief
Judge Rosen filed a memorandum on the bankruptcy court docket encouraging Judge Rhodes to approve
the agreement and overrule all objections. Mediators' Recommendation for Approval of Settlement
Between the Debtor and Swap Counterparties, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2013)
(No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2343-1. Judge Rhodes rejected the settlement as being too expensive for the
city, outside the range of reasonableness. Transcript of Bench Opinion, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Jan. 16, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2521; Order Denying Debtor's Assumption Motion, In re
City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 17, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2511. The court approved a
reformulated swaps settlement in April. Transcript of Bench Opinion Regarding Motion to Approve
Compromise, In re City ofDetroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 4057.
229. Transcript of Bench Opinion (Jan. 16) at 28, supra note 228 ("The Court agrees
that the settlement of the swaps claims is better for everyone than litigation and hopes that everyone still
agrees with that. If the city feels the need to pursue immediate litigation, so be it, but even so, litigation
and negotiation can and should be pursued at the same time. In any event, the Court strongly encourages
the parties to continue to negotiate."). Bomey, Gallagher & Stryker, supra note 5 ("Afterward, away from
the news media, Rhodes addressed creditors privately, asking them what they were willing to settle for.
'He goes around to each person and goes, 'What's your number, what's your number, what's your
number?" said one person familiar with the matter. 'Then he says, 'Guys, don't ever do that to me again
with Rosen."'); Transcript of Bench Opinion (Jan. 16) at 28, supra note 228 (court clearing the courtroom
of non-attorneys).
230. Transcript of Motion of Debtor for Entry of an Order Vacating the Appointment
of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors at 27, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb. 19,
2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2717 (expressing that the committee's statement that it would not
participate in the mediation exhibited an "extraordinary lack of understanding"); id. at 31 ("i already have
a mediator that's a consensus builder. Give me something else that I can say to the city will add value to
this case [sic]."); In re City of Detroit, 519 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) ("The Committee's
stated disavowal of the mediation process is extraordinary in its manifest disrespect for the importance of
mediation in this chapter 9 case.").
231. Transcript of Bench Opinion (Apr. 11), supra note 228, at 26 (telling parties not
to wait until the eve of confirmation and commending parties that already settled).
232. Transcript of Trial Re. Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, supra note 7, at 242 (in
response to information that a matter had not settled, court says "Does Judge Rosen know that?.. One
does not want to surprise Judge Rosen especially with that kind of news.").
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presiding judge did not reject the characterization. 233 At the end of the case,
Judge Rhodes called his own best act the recruiting of Chief Judge Rosen.234 The
mediation put the federal court in a profoundly powerful position, with
continuous opportunities to shape municipal reform.
D. Team Building
With the mediation as just one illustration, Judge Rhodes recruited help in
several categories to oversee and evaluate the Detroit bankruptcy, increasing the
reach of the federal court and its ongoing interaction with state and local officials
and other parties. In two out of three instances, the court gave parties the
opportunity to be heard before making the initial appointments.23 Some
appointees put their own teams in place, without a mechanism for party input,
and some of those team members interacted with public officials and parties.
1. Professional Fee Team
Early in Detroit's bankruptcy, the court sua sponte proposed appointing
someone to review the fees and expenses of professionals paid by the city. 236
Prior to the Detroit bankruptcy, it was thought that a court had no fee oversight
rights or duties in a municipal bankruptcy other than at plan confirmation.237 Not
clearly authorized even in Chapter 11, where courts have the duty to review
233. Transcript of Hearing Re. Motion by Official Committee of Retirees to Stay
Deadlines at 26, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich., Sept. 19, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1037
("LAWYER: Your honor has already dealt with, in effect, the possibility of delay by asking Judge Rosen
to crack heads and move people, which is what he is doing. COURT: Well, that's not exactly the language
I used with him. Okay. I'll accept it. LAWYER: If I misunderstood, please tell me. COURT: No. I did tell
him that his - I'll share this with you. I did tell him that his deliverable is a confirmable plan"). Id. at 44
(court asking city lawyer, "[h]ow do you deal with Mr. Montgomery's argument that there's nothing about
the relief he requests here today that would have any impact on the negotiations for a plan and Judge
Rosen is going to crack heads at my request?").
234. Oral Opinion on the Record at 45, supra note 5 ("I have said publicly and repeat
now that the smartest thing I did in this case was to ask Judge Rosen to be the mediator."); id. at 44 ("These
words of thanks cannot begin to express the depth of gratitude that 1, and all of the parties and attorneys,
feel about what Chief Judge Rosen and his mediation team put into this case-the work, the time, the
creativity, the commitment, the nights, the weekends, and the holidays."). See also Jim Lynch, Rosen
Gives Behind-the-Scenes Look at Bankruptcy Case, DET. NEWS, Nov. 10, 2014. See also Judge Rhodes
Reflects on the Detroit Case, AM. BANKR. INST. (video interview by Lois Lupica),
http://www.abi.org/podcasts/judge-rhodes-reflects-on-detroit-case-videocast-005 (3:30-6:00) (appointing
Chief Judge Rosen was "the smartest thing" he did in the case).
235. The exception was the appointment of a non-testifying consultant to the court.
Infra Part III.D.3.
236. Order Establishing Amended Initial Status Conference Agenda at 4, In re City of
Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich., July 23, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0129 (listing authority for a fee
examiner as I I U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 943(b)(3) and 1129(a)(3), applicable to chapter 9 via § 901(a)).
237. In re Colorado Centre Metro. Dist., 139 B.R. 534, 535 (1992) (interpreting II
U.S.C. § 943(b)(3)). In his plan confirmation decision, Judge Rhodes interpreted the statute to authorize
reviewing fees and expenses already paid. In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at 204-11; Order Regarding
Process to Determine the Reasonableness of Fees Under II U.S.C. § 943(b)(3), In re City of Detroit
(Bankr. E.D. Mich., Jan. 5, 2015) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8999.
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fees,238 the "fee examiner" is an especially awkward fit with a municipal case. 2 39
Judge Rhodes was apparently the first to propose a fee examiner in a Chapter
9.240
Due to section 904 and the nature of the contemplated duties, the judge
needed the debtor's consent. In open court and after filing a proposed order,
Judge Rhodes expressed hope that the city would not object.241 He justified the
proposal on public and media scrutiny, and invited collaboration on the details
of the appointment. 242 The city did not oppose the proposal, and agreed to pay
the fee examiner's own fees and expenses.
243
Judge Rhodes appointed Chicago lawyer Robert Fishman (apparently the
court's own selection), who then obtained access to detailed records for legal and
financial professionals representing the City and the retiree committee. 244
Fishman did not work alone; at least twenty-nine additional lawyers and
paraprofessionals at his law firm were listed as potential contributors.2 45 The fee
examiner team also included an accountant in Florida and twenty-three of the
accountant's employees.
246
238. Fee examiners resemble special masters, who are not permitted in bankruptcy
cases. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9031; In re Continental Airlines et al., 150 B.R. 334, 342 (D. Del. 1993)
(characterizing Chapter II fee reviewer as "more in the nature of a special master" and reversing
bankruptcy court's decision to restrict access to report). Courts nonetheless appoint fee examiners in
Chapter 11 cases. Order Appointing Fee Examiner and Establishing Related Procedures for Compensation
and Reimbursement of Expenses for Professionals and Consideration of Fee Applications, In re Nortel
Networks, Inc., No. 09-10138(KG) (Bankr. D. Del. July 10, 2013); In re Collins & Aikman Corp, 368
B.R. 623, 625-626 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007) (Judge Rhodes appointing fee examiner later in case over
objections).
239. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (excluding the incorporation of 11 U.S.C. § 330).
240. Steven Church, Deiroit Fee Examiner Gets Paid to Second Guess Bills,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 21, 2013 ("Keach and the other bankruptcy lawyers ... can't remember such a
system being used in... Chapter 9, which ... doesn't require cities to submit their fees to the judge for
approval.").
241. Transcript of Hearing Re. Status Conference, supra note 113, at 57.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 58.
244. Order Appointing Fee Examiner, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich., Aug.
19, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0383; Fee Review Order, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich.,
Sept. 11, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0810. The scope expanded to cover the retiree committee's
investment banker, for which the city would pay. Hearing Re. Application to Employ Lazard Freres &
Co., LLC at 4-9, In re City of Detroit, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2013) (No, 13-53846), ECF No. 2229
("So what will you and the others ... do for $175,000 a month?" "[Alre we paying for your leaming
curve?"); id. at 10 (stating that fee examiner had no questions and saw no unique problems). Judge Rhodes
later decided that the Detroit Retirement Systems' fees should be reviewed. Opinion and Order
Determining that the Fees and Expenses of Retirement Systems' Professionals are Subject to 11 U.S.C §
943(b)(3) at 2, In re City of Detroit (3ankr. E.D. Mich., Nov. 26, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8470.
245. Order Appointing Fee Examiner, supra note 244, at 6.
246. Idat 11.
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2. Mediation Team
The master mediation order discussed earlier gave Chief Judge Rosen the
authority to appoint help.24 7 Shortly after being appointed, Chief Judge Rosen
announced five other mediators, mostly federal judges, including one who
mediated in the California municipal bankruptcies. 24 8 Chief Judge Rosen added
another judge, retained a professor who eventually served as a mediator,249 and
had also been working with Richard Ravitch before Judge Rhodes selected him
as a consultant. 250 Arbitrators of tort claims also were formally under Chief
Judge Rosen's umbrella.25' These appointments further increased the federal
court's off-the-record interaction with state and local officials, creditors, and
other parties and stakeholders.
3. Feasibility Team
Judge Rhodes committed to an independent inquiry into the feasibility of
Detroit's restructuring plan-a condition of confirmation. 252 To this end, Judge
Rhodes issued an order to show cause, sua sponte, for why he shouldn't name a
court-appointed expert to evaluate the feasibility of Detroit's restructuring
plan. 253 No party opposed this idea outright, but some suggested adjustments. 25 4
247. Mediation Order, supra note 197, clause 3.
248. Detroit Chapter 9 Mediation Team Announced, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Aug. 20, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 0542.
249. Transcript at 10, Settlement Between Debtor and Swap Counter Parties, In re City
of Detroit (E.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2013) (No. 13-53846) (mentioning "our consultant, Professor Torielli");
Press Conference, Nov. 7, 2014 (Chief Judge Rosen explaining that Professor Torielli had become a
mediator).
250. Press Conference, Nov. 7, 2014 (approximately 15:25) (joking that Judge Rhodes
"stole" Ravitch from the mediation team, but before then, Ravitch's wisdom and advice were invaluable).
251. Id. (between 14:00-15:25) (thanking Judge David Lawson for overseeing tort
claimant process).
252. See supra notes 160- 161, and accompanying text; 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012).
253. Order to Show Cause Why Expert Witnesses Should Not Be Appointed, In re City
of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 3170. Judge Rhodes has used
Rule 706 before. Collins & Aikman, 368 B.R. 623, 625 (Bankr. E.D, Mich. 2007) (fee examiner
appointment). For other bankruptcy court decisions discussing or ordering court-appointed experts, see
D&M Steel v. Neilson (In re Peck/Jones Constr. Corp.), No. BAP CC-09-1414KiTaPa, 2010 WL 6245626
(9th Cir. BAP Aug. 26, 2010) (appointing expert to determine whether a pre-bankruptcy transfer could be
construed as being in the ordinary course of business, insulating it from voidable preference attack); In re
Peck/Jones Constr. Corp., No. BAP CC-09-1414KiTaPa, 2010 WL 6245626 at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug.
26, 2010) (affirming authority of court to use Rule 706, but expressing concerns about court disallowing
party experts and replacing with court-appointed expert); In re Gainey Corp., 400 B.R. 576, 577 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich., Dec. 10, 2008) (appointing expert to advise on whether to approve a debtor's contested
request to use cash collateral); In re Loehwing, 320 B.R. 281, 284 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005) (describing
appointment of expert to conduct survey on sheriffs' foreclosure sale commissions); In re Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Portland, 339 B.R. 215, 223 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006) (discussing possibility of appointing
expert to develop form questionnaire and matrix for claims' settlement value and jury trial value); In re
McMullen, No. 00-1051 -WCH, 2009 WL 1490581 at *20 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 27,2009) (entering order
to show cause why accountant should not be appointed).
254. Reporting that it had planned to file its own Rule 706 request, Transcript of
Hearing Regarding Notice of Presentment of Order at 14-15, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
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Judge Rhodes accepted some of the narrower recommendations but retained the
basic structure and scope. 255
The court filed a solicitation for candidates in early April 2014.256 With
party participation, Judge Rhodes interviewed five candidates in the
courtroom. 257 He selected Martha Kopacz.258 Kopacz's duties involved private
contact with the presiding judge, city officials, and other parties. With advance
notice, Judge Rhodes reviewed her expert report before it was circulated to the
parties.2 59 And during the plan confirmation trial, Judge Rhodes asked Kopacz
to describe their contact. 260 They discussed the confirmation trial, she said, but
not her testimony, he had sent her a list of questions and had invited feedback on
the questions, but she did not provide it.
26 1
Kopacz also testified to participating in over two hundred meetings with
city officials and other parties.2 62 The parties included: the Detroit mayor, the
Detroit emergency manager, Detroit City Council members, most department
heads, representatives of the DIA, foundations funding the Grand Bargain,
lawyers for the pension systems, and others. 263  Mayor Duggan's plan
confirmation testimony likewise painted a picture of extensive interaction, in
which Kopacz or her staff
sat in on every single meeting with every department head. She was invited to all
cabinet meetings. She had open access to all of our departments and all of their -
April 2, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 3817, Detroit suggested the use of a panel of experts and
recommended a particular person to lead the panel, Debtors' [sic] Concurrence with the Court's
Appointment of Experts Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 706 at 4, 5-6, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
March 30, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 3328. Other parties asked that the expert also consider whether
the plan was in the best interests of creditors. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 254, at 17, 19, 22.
255. Order Regarding the Solicitation of Applications to Serve as the Court's Expert
Witness on the Issue of Feasibility, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. April 2, 2014) (No. 13-53846),
ECF No. 3610. Multiple experts could be appointed, however, if no single expert had all of the required
qualifications. Id. at 2.
256. Id.
257. Notice Regarding Interviews of Expert Witness Applicants, In re City of Detroit
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. April 14, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 4068.
258. Order Appointing Expert Witness, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr.
22, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 4215. As described by Kopacz at the plan confirmation trial, her job
was to "render an opinion on the feasibility of the plan of adjustment for the City of Detroit and to render
an opinion on the reasonableness of the assumptions that underlie the revenues, expenses, and the plan
payments." Transcript ofContinued Trial at 138, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2014)
(No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7617.
259. Order Regarding Report of Court's Expert, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. July 16, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 6090; Transcript of Hearing Regarding Motion for Costs
Relating to Clawback of Debtor's Document Production at 43, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
July 14, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 6054. Syncora's lawyer expressed surprise, and asked whether
the discussion between the court and expert would be discoverable. The court said yes. Id.
260. Kopacz kept a log of her communications with the court. Transcript of Continued
Trial, supra note 258, at 139-140.
261. Id. at 139 (They discussed logistics, such as whether her attorney would be
present.).
262. Id. at 159.
263. Id. at 159-61.
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our numbers. And I relied in reaching my conclusion both on my own assessment
of this but also on the report that she wrote, which was really my only independent
verification from a financial expert of what I experienced in those interviews. 264
Kopacz employed at least a half a dozen professionals or paraprofessionals
at her firm to work on this project,265 and at least three lawyers. 266 The assistance
of these other people supplied more channels for information flow to and from
the court's team. 267
Richard Ravitch, a lawyer associated with New York City's financial crisis
in the 1970s, had applied and interviewed for the court's feasibility expert
position. 261 Judge Rhodes instead appointed Ravitch to a position that had not
been advertised: a non-testifying consultant.269 The court did not seek consent
from the parties before making this appointment. No parties objected publicly
when the appointment was announced. Ravitch's charge was to focus on "issues
of municipal finance and viability." 270 The court order provided that "[a]ll
interested parties and their professionals shall fully and promptly cooperate with
the Court's consultant and shall promptly comply with any requests for
information made by the consultant. '271
By design, the information would flow only in one direction; Ravitch would
be insulated from requests to testify, or providing other information. 272 This
procedure afforded parties no opportunity to rebut Ravitch's specific analyses or
contributions. The absence of procedural protections rendered the appointment
vulnerable to challenge, at least as measured by the law in other circuits.273
264. Transcript of Trial Re. Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, supra note 7, at 101-102.
265. Phoenix Mgmt. Serv., LLC invoice, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. June
30, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 5662; Letter from Martha E.M. Kopacz to Judge Rhodes, re: invoice
for April 22, 2014-April 30,2014, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. June 12,2014) (No. 13-53846),
ECF No. 5293; Invoice, Phoenix Mgmt. Serv., LLC, invoice for Oct. 2014, In re City of Detroit (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Jan. 9, 2015) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 9018 (five); Transcript of Continued Trial at 155-58,
In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 15, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7617 (reporting
professionals who worked on court-appointed Detroit assignment as Brian Gleason, Bob Childree, Al
Mink, Mike Gaul, Kevin Barr, Jack Murdoch).
266. Letter from Stephen D. Lerner to Judge Rhodes, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. June 24, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 5606; Order Approving Compensation and
Reimbursement of Expenses of Attorneys to the Court's Expert Witness, In re City of Detroit (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. July 9, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 5869.
267. Transcript of Continued Trial at 160, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
Sept. 15, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7617 (testifying on high frequency of meetings between
members of Kopacz's team and parties to the case and their professionals).
268. Notice Regarding Interviews, supra note 257.
269. Order Appointing Non-Testifying Consultant, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Apr. 22, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 4216.
270. Id. at 1.
271. Id. at 1.
272. Id. at I ("Unless the Court orders otherwise, the consultant shall not be subject to
any discovery proceedings and shall not be called as a witness at any hearing in this case.").
273. FTC v. Enforma Natural Prod., Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2004)
(record unclear on basis on which advisor was appointed, vacating injunction, identifying safeguards to
ensure court "is proceeding openly and fairly" and instructing court to "clarify the role of any expert it
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Ravitch served without compensation.27 4 The arrangement therefore generated
no public documents on how this federal court appointee spent his time.2 75 In a
speech in June 2014, Ravitch offered the following insight:
Well I'm somewhat constrained in being too specific. My role in Detroit is simply
to advise the bankruptcy judge about the feasibility of the plan that ultimately gets
finalized in the next few weeks. Suffice it to say that there are a lot of very very
good people who are trying very hard to adjust the limited resources equitably
amongst the various creditors, whether they're money creditors or retirees .... If
the bankruptcy plan does not go through I think it would be a tragedy. Whether
it's this one or a modified one is something I can't comment on.
2 76
Testimony during the plan confirmation trial in the fall of 2014 suggests
that Ravitch was in close contact with Kopacz, the court's feasibility expert. She
reported that, after delegating some pension review to staff, "1 reinserted myself
into the pension discussions when I met and got to know Dick Ravitch because
Dick has some interesting views." 27 7 Indeed, a lawyer for the city sought to
bolster Kopacz's credibility as an expert on pensions by pointing out that she had
conferred with "Mr. Ravitch, who needs no introduction because of his enormous
expertise. '278 As noted earlier, Kopacz, in turn, had extensive interactions with
the city.
Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan testified during the plan confirmation trial that
Ravitch also gave policy advice directly to city officials while serving as the
court's non-testifying consultant:
appoints"); Techsearch L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating goal of
appointment was "so that the court can better understand scientific and technical evidence in order to
properly discharge its gatekeeper role of determining the admissibility"); id. at 1377-79 n.6 (finding
appellate court must review whether "district court has established safeguards to prevent the technical
advisor from introducing new evidence and to assure that the technical advisor does not influence the
district court's review of the factual disputes"); Ass'n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d
572, 590-91 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court's authority to appoint technical advisor, for outside
technical expertise would be helpful, noting split in court is over procedures); Conservation Law Found.
v. Evans, 203 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding advisor "shall not give any advice to the
Court on the ultimate issue" and court committing to "summarize the amount and nature of its reliance on
the technical advisor"); Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150, 150 (D. R.I. 1998) (appointing
economist to provide neutral technical advice to help determine loss of eaming capacity of an infant).
274. Order Appointing Non-Testifying Consultant, supra note 269, at I ("The
consultant has agreed to serve without expense to the City. . . . The Court expresses its thanks and
appreciation to Mr. Ravitch for his willingness to serve the Court in this capacity without compensation.").
275. When Ravitch attended a status conference telephonically, he was silent other than
to indicate his presence at the judge's request. Transcript of Hearing Regarding Status Conference
Regarding Plan Confirmation Process at 7, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2014) (No.
13-53846), ECF No. 6585.
276. Richard Ravitch, JEWISH COMMUNITY CTR. OF S.F. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:29 AM),
http://podcasts.jccsf.org/2014/08/richard-ravitch/ (podcast interview by David Crane with Jewish
Community Center of San Francisco).
277. Transcript of Continued Trial at 161-62, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
Sept. 15, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7617.
278. Id. at 202.
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the Court was good enough to bring in Mr. Dick Ravitch, who I spent a great deal
of time with, and who educated me on just how far we have to go to rebuild the
finance system.
27 9
Mayor Duggan's testimony also indicated that Ravitch had set up a meeting
in New York for Duggan Ravitch's recommendation for the position of Detroit's
finance director.280 Mayor Duggan testified to "extensive conversations" with
Ravitch about the need to keep the city's financing at the lowest possible
amount. 28 1 The interaction between Mayor Duggan and Ravitch was later
reported in the local news: "[Ravitch] has had great influence on me already,"
Duggan said, speaking of the advice he received during the bankruptcy.282
Ravitch influenced the presiding judge's evaluation of the case as well:
His commitment, knowledge, wisdom, expertise, and spirit of public service were
remarkable and helped me to more fully understand this case. I hope a way is
found for him to contribute to fiscal health and revitalization of this City. He
would be a valuable resource in any capacity.
28 3
This wish was granted: Ravitch was named as a consultant to the Detroit
Financial Review Commission.284
E. Court of the People
. . .when a judge feels and sees injustice, I believe that a judge has a
responsibility to do what he or she can about it .... [ felt that by calling out the
water department and asking to speak personally with the decision makers and
highlighting this problem in open court with the full attention of the media on the
issue I was doing what I could even if1 didn't have jurisdiction to deal with it. 285
279. Transcript of Trial Re. Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, supra note 7, at 76-77.
280. Id. at 77 (Mayor Duggan testifying that he had asked Ravitch, "if you could hire
anybody in America to come in here to redo the finances, who would it be" and Ravitch responding,
"There's no question. The former finance director of the City of New York, Carol O'Cleireacain, would
be the top choice"); id. ("Mr. Ravitch was kind enough to set up lunch for me, and I flew out to New
York....").
281. Id. at 144-45.
282. Matt Helms, He Rescued New York. Up Next: Detroit, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 17,
2014. The story also mentions Ravitch's recommendation for Detroit's finance director.
283. Oral Opinion on the Record at 46, supra note 5.
284. Press Release, Gov. Rick Snyder Taps Public, Private Fiscal Experts for Detroit
Financial Review Commission (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-
57577 57657-340967-,00.html. Kopacz also was selected as a consultant to this Commission.
285. WDET Interview, supra note 131.
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It was as much apolitical case as a legal case... The residents of the city
had a great stake in [the] outcome of the case, a personal stake, each and every
one of them. 286
Early on, Judge Rhodes emphasized his responsibility to "recognize and
appreciate the enormous public interest in this case. '287 His public court
procedures were inclusive, allowing participation by individual retirees as well
as residents, the latter of whom lack creditor status .288 The court held a hearing
for individual objectors to Detroit's bankruptcy eligibility, 289 did the same for
plan confirmation, 290 and invited some individuals to present evidence at the plan
confirmation trial itself.29' Early in the case, Judge Rhodes invited courtroom
audience questions after speaking about the role of a judge in Chapter 9.292 When
bond insurers argued that retirees should be barred from filing proofs of claim
because pension funds would do so, the court defended retirees' rights to directly
participate. 293 When creditors raised objections to other municipal activities,
286. Ferretti & Livengood, supra note 142 (quoting Judge Rhodes).
287. Transcript of Hearing on Status Conference, supra note 113, at 8-9.
288. Compare In re Addison Comm. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1994) (Judge Rhodes declined residents' request to speak on Chapter 9 plan of adjustment because they
were not creditors).
289. Transcript of Hearing Re. Objections to Eligibility Before the Honorable Steven
W. Rhodes at 2, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1034;
Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, supra note 29, at 864-65 (recounting hearing testimony
and Judge Rhodes' admonition to Michigan's Governor and Detroit's emergency manager to listen to a
recording). Other municipal bankruptcies have included resident testimony, although on a more ad hoc
basis. E.g., Cate Long, Jefferson County's Bankruptcy Confirmation Hearing, REUTERS MUNiLAND
(November 21, 2013) http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2013/11/21/jefferson-countys-bankruptcy-
confirmation-hearing (audience members speaking at hearing on Nov. 20, 2013).
290. Notice of Hearing to Individuals Who Filed Plan Objections, In re City of Detroit
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. June 10, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 5264; In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at
165 ("At the hearing, 46 of these 79 objectors appeared before the Court."). Of the 1159 objections
submitted by unrepresented individuals, 836 were timely filed. Id at 165.
291. In re City ofDetroit, 524 B.R. 147, 166 ("Parties filed 36 such motions. Upon its
review of each motion, the Court allowed seven parties to testify."); Order Regarding Motions to
Participate in the Confirmation Hearing, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2014) (No. 13-
53846), ECF No. 6896 (referring back to solicitation of interest in presenting evidence, document 6584).
Three selected objectors did not appear. 524 BR. 147, 166. Most of those selected were workers or
retirees; two were residents. Transcript of In Re: Trial Re: Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, supra note 144
(individual objector examining emergency manager on Oct. 3); Trial Re. Objections to Chapter 9 Plan, In
re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8033 (main day for
individual objectors to present sworn testimony or ask questions of witnesses during plan confirmation
trial).
292. Transcript of Hearing Re. Status Conference, supra note 113, at 7-10; Brent
Snavely, Judge Steven Rhodes Explains His Limited Role in Detroit Case, DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 2, 2013,
http://archive.freep.com/article/20130802/NEWS0I/308020140/Judge-Steven-Rhodes-Detroit-
bankruptcy.
293. Hearing Re. Motion of the Objectors for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery at
29, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1771.
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 33, 2016
Judge Rhodes expressed concern that the residents would have to wait even one
additional day for basic service restoration.29 4
As these measures increased the information flow, they perhaps
inadvertently presented the court with opportunities to weigh in on local policy
and personnel matters. For example, after hearing a complaint about residential
water shutoffs, the judge requested the presence of a water department
representative that afternoon.295 Judge Rhodes asked the representative detailed
questions about policies, made suggestions about those policies,296 and asked the
representative to return the next week with more answers and updates. 297 The
return trip to court left little doubt that the court had influenced the city's
handling of the matter, at least in the short term. 298 Detroit imposed a brief
moratorium on residential water shutoffs and increased efforts to educate the
public about financial assistance programs. 29 9 Apparently encouraged by this
294. Hearing Re. City of Detroit's Motion for Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtor
to Enter into and Perform Under Certain Transaction Documents With The Public Lighting Authority at
21, 35, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1877 (quoting
judge saying "I wonder if you'll ever be satisfied" and "hundreds of thousands of people victims of crime
while we wait?"). See also Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Regarding Motion of the Debtor for a Final
Order at 110, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2512 (in
closing arguments on swap termination agreement and financing, court asking city lawyer, "Is it your
position that the people of the City of Detroit have to wait for safe lighting for a plan of adjustment?"); id.
at 112 ("So the citizens of Detroit have to wait for safe lighting when the city manager - or the city
emergency manager decides that it's necessary or appropriate to get court permission because that then
would have to wait for plan confirmation? ... What about the safety of the citizens? ... So in deciding
between necessary and appropriate process in Bankruptcy Court and citizen safety, he's got to choose one
or the other?").
295. Transcript of Hearing Re. Objections to Chapter 9 Plan at 54, In re City of Detroit
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 15, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No 6141 ("I'm going to ask you, if it's at all
possible, to have someone here at this aftemoon's session who can advise the Court and the public about
the specifics of the program."). Judge Rhodes noted at the outset that he hesitated to raise the issue because
he was "reasonably sure that it's probably not within my jurisdiction, but I'm going to anyway." Id. at 53.
296. Id. at 55 ("What can you tell me about the water department's program for water
shutoffs for customers who haven't paid their bills?"); id. at 58 ("Does the department itself have a
program to defer payment of delinquencies or amortize them over a period of time?); id. at 59 (soliciting
information on the average delinquency among people who seek a payment plan); id. at 61 (asking if there
is any flexibility in the 36-month amortization period); id. at 63 (asking about outreach efforts and
staffing).
297. Id. at 65 ("Well, I'll just comment for whatever it's worth to you that it seems to
me that there's much more you can do than just that, and I encourage you to work with community leaders
to come up with a whole list of initiatives that can be effective at solving this problem. In fact, I have to
say to you I'm feeling the need to ask you to come back ...."); id. at 66 ("Are you willing to do that,
sir?").
298. Transcript of Hearing Regarding Motion for Temporary Allowance of Claim at
17-24, in re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 21, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 6244 (Lattimer
reporting what city had done to respond to judge's concerns); Alisa Priddle & Matt Helms, Judge Rhodes:
Water Shutoffs are Hurting Detroit's Reputation Internationally, DET. FREE PRESS, July 15, 2014,
http://archive.freep.com/article/20140715/NEWS01/307150125/bankruptcy-water-officials.
299. Zenobia Jeffries, Detroit Water Department Places 15-Day Moratorium on
Shutoffs, NEW AM. MEDIA, July 23, 2014 ("The announcement came following Federal Judge Steven
Rhodes' order for the department and Emergency Manager Kevyn Off to come up with a solution to what
he called an embarrassment to the city and the bankruptcy proceeding."),
http://newamericamedia.org/2014/07/detroit-water-department-places- 15-day-moratorium-on-
shutoffs.php.
Detroit Bankruptcy
course of events, resident advocates requested an injunction of residential water
shutoffs.3 °° Judge Rhodes allowed the parties to file papers and make oral
arguments before denying the request for reasons that included, but were not
limited, to section 904,301 presumably hoping that the city and the plaintiffs
would forge a compromise in the meantime.
There are other examples. When it became clear that the emergency
manager's appointment would expire before the bankruptcy ended, and the city's
continued retention of the law firm Jones Day seemed less than certain, the court
said,
Well, I just want to say for the record that it would be a really bad idea for the
city, the mayor, to terminate Jones Day's services at such a critical phase in this
process .... I hope the mayor hears me. Feel free to communicate my view of
this to him. 302
Mayor Duggan quickly made clear that they would continue to use Jones
Day. Also, at the express request of Wayne County, the court ordered mediation
on the creation of a regional water authority. 30 3 Going beyond what was strictly
necessary, the court said its decision to send the matter to mediation reflected a
sense,
unrebutted in the record here, that the creation of a regional water authority is not
only in the best interest of the city but also in the best interest of all of the
customers in the city's Water Department. .... I also have a sense that this
bankruptcy offers a unique opportunity for the creation of that regional authority
and that if we do not take advantage of this unique opportunity, the opportunity
will, in all likelihood, be lost forever .... 304
Such a statement does not bind the city to reach a deal, of course. The
interest of some parties in a regional water authority long preceded the
300. Lyda v. City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 21, 2014) (No. 14-04732)
(requesting an order enjoining residential water shutoffs).
301. Minute Entry: Case Dismissed, Lyda v. City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept.
29, 2014) (No. 14-04732); Transcript of Hearing Regarding Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at
5-24, Lyda v. City of Detroit, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2014) (No. 14-04732), ECF No. 84; Lyda v.
City of Detroit, 14-04732, 2014 WL 6474081 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2014) (denying motion for
rehearing and supplementing initial bench decision); Order Affirming Bankruptcy Court Orders, Lyda v.
City of Detroit (E.D Mich. Sept. 16, 2015) (15-CV-10038) (upholding bankruptcy court decision
regarding adversary proceeding regarding residential water shutoffs).
302. Hearing Transcript at 270-271, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 28,
2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 5183; Joe Guillen & Mark Stryker, Bankruptcy Judge Scolds Duggan,
Calls Any Plan to Fire Law Firm a 'Bad Idea,' DET. FREE PRESS, May 29, 2014,
http://archive.freep.com/article/20140528/NEWS01/305280182/bankruptcy%20hearing%20Judge%2OSt
even%20Rhodes.
303. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 145, at 18-19.
304. Id.
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bankruptcy.305 But awareness of the court's support for such an authority, as the
parties continued to negotiate a variety of issues, was hardly irrelevant.
Judge Rhodes also reminded professionals to keep the details of the case
accessible to stakeholders. With respect to notices being written for individual
claimants, Judge Rhodes noted, "I can't emphasize enough the importance of
plain language in this document. . . . I wish you had an eighth grade English
teacher on staff to edit this for you."3 06 He encouraged lawyers to be proactive in
ensuring accurate press reporting.30 7 In closing arguments on a motion to approve
a settlement, Judge Rhodes interjected to clarify a lawyer's assertions, noting
that he wanted to make sure the public understood the issue. 308 That point was
representative of efforts to break through financial and legal jargon.309
The court's approach to oversight also reflected a view that state and city
actors do not get preferential treatment, even in municipal bankruptcy. When the
Governor of Michigan raised new objections in a last-minute filing, the court
reacted with the same frustration that would have been directed toward any
party.310 The judge questioned the assumption that the Governor should get
special flexibility in scheduling court testimony.3 ' When the state had delayed
getting approval of a transaction through its own processes, the court expressed
disappointment that the state's lack of action risked wasting time and money in
the bankruptcy court.3"2 These matters are reminders that the federal court may
305. John Wisely & Matt Helms, Proposed Regional Water Authority Could Be $50M
Boost for Detroit, DET. FREE PRESS, March 10, 2013 (in story preceding bankruptcy filing, reporting on
confidential plan for regional authority, and long-brewing interest in such a regional system).
306. Hearing Re. Motion of the Debtor at 29, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
Nov. 14, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1771.
307. Hearing re Notice of Presentment of Order at 74-75, In re City of Detroit (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. April 2,2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 3817.
308. Evidentiary Hearing Regarding Motion of the Debtor for a Final Order at 10, In
re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2512 (in response to swap
counterparty assertion that termination payment was part and parcel with the fixing of interest rates).
309. Transcript of Hearing Re: Eligibility Trial at 193, In re City of Detroit (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1411 (during testimony at eligibility trial, asking
witness to explain the phrase "liquidity was tight" in order that "the record is clear and everyone
understands"); id. at 229-231 (seeking clarification of expressions "P-O-C," "cash bum," and "unpool").
310. Transcript of Hearing, In Re: Notice of Proposed Fee Review Order at 62-63, In
re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 948 (Judge to lawyer for
Governor Snyder: "You filed a brief yesterday for a hearing today and you want the parties to respond
and me to rule on this?... [You filed the brief] at 20 minutes till 5:00."); id at 66 ("But you-you made
the conscious decision to get a ruling on-on--on relevance and then if you lose that to assert the
privilege."); id. at 68 ("Is it really in the best interest of the city and the people of the State of Michigan
for the Governor to be asserting a deliberative process privilege in this case, Ma'am?").
311. Transcript of Hearing Re. Eligibility Trial, at 51, In re City of Detroit (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Oct 23, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 1411 (court to Governor's lawyer: "it's not for a
witness who appears in any court to condition his appearance on a specific time limit").
312. Transcript of Hearing In Re Motion of the Debtor for a Final Order at 8, In re City
of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 2280 (expressing displeasure to
Michigan's lawyer that Emergency Loan Board did not approve Detroit's proposed loan before
commencement of hearing, the Court asked "[slomeone actually made the decision to potentially risk
wasting the Court's time and all of the attorney fees in this case?").
Detroit Bankruptcy
be in an ongoing relationship with state and local officials during a municipal
bankruptcy.
F. Summary
The preceding sections have presented a federal court's active engagement
with and involvement in a city's restructuring and reform, even as the presiding
judge references the federalist structure of municipal bankruptcy.313 For those
steeped in high profile mass tort or institutional reform cases, Detroit may
resonate.31 4 But the story clashes with the municipal bankruptcy literature.3" 5
The judicial appointment materials indicate that Judge Rhodes was chosen
in part for his case management and administrative skills. By necessity, that
selection was preceded by discussion among judges from the circuit, district, and
bankruptcy courts.3" 6 Judge Rhodes could therefore handle the case with
something of a blessing from the courts, including from the chief judge of the
district court who would be a participant in overseeing the case. 317 Upon
establishing an optimistic and detailed timeline, Judge Rhodes managed the case
on micro and macro levels, creatively using inquisitorial techniques to
accomplish indirectly what could not be done directly.3" 8 Information flowed
between the court and parties in the full range of hearings and status conferences,
educating the judge about important facts and conveying to the parties the
judge's beliefs and preferences.
313. Lyda v. City of Detroit, 14-04732, 2014 WL 6474081 at *2, *4 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
Nov. 19, 2014) ("The [section 904] limitation means that the Court cannot interfere with the choices a
municipality makes as to what services and benefits it will provide," although section 904 does not protect
city from plaintiffs' constitutional claims); Supplemental Opinion, supra note 1, at 153 (recommending
future steps for city "while remaining cautious due to the limits on the Court's authority"); id. at 165
("under the Tenth Amendment, however, it is for the City, not this Court, to supervise the execution of
that recovery"); In re City of Detroit, supra note 1, at 164 (responding to Kopacz's concern about the case
being too swift by stating that his managerial approach was "entirely consistent with the limitations of
federalism that the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution imposes and that §§ 903 and 904
manifest"); Transcript of Hearing Re. Status Conference, supra note 113, at 9-10 ("[T]he Court has no
role to play in managing or running the city or any of the services it provides. Any compliments,
complaints, suggestions, or requests regarding city services should continue to be directed to the city.
There is nothing the Court can do about any of those matters .... The city's officials are not accountable
to this Court for how they run the city .... It is not the Court's role to dictate to the city what its plan
should state or even to suggest anything about it. That is entirely for the city to decide after, of course,
discussing and attempting to negotiate the plan with its creditors."); Opinion and Order Regarding the
Reasonableness of Fees Under 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(3) at 4, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb.
12, 2015) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 9256.
314. Peter H. Schuck, TheRoleofJudges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 347 (1986) (about Agent Orange, stating, "the judge and special masters
displayed a degree of skill, sophistication, imagination, and artistry in fashioning the settlement that almost
all the participants viewed as highly unusual").
315. Supra Part 1.
316. Supra Part III.A.
317. Supra Part II1.C.
318. Supra Part III.B.
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Issues at the core of the debt restructuring and the city's reform underwent
a confidential mediation process heavily supervised by Chief Judge Rosen and
other federal judges. In crafting and pushing for the central settlement in the case,
Chief Judge Rosen met and worked with politicians, raised funds from
foundations, and became an outspoken public advocate for the resulting
restructuring plan.31 9 In the meantime, the typical appellate pipeline for
bankruptcy court orders was all but suspended, in anticipation that settlement
would moot the appeals. 320
By enlisting teams of people to assist with the court's work, the federal
bankruptcy court further increased involvement with state and local affairs. The
mediation and feasibility teams forged lines of private communication with the
city and other parties on behalf of the court. The resulting discourse generated
close collaboration between the city and the court's helpers.321
Back at the courthouse, Judge Rhodes created an inclusive process that gave
more public credibility to a case that was highly controversial at its inception.
The court's receptivity to stakeholder input and awareness of the broader public
discourse led, perhaps inevitably, to the expression of substantive opinions on
policy (e.g., regional water authority, residential water shutoffs) and personnel
(the retention of restructuring professionals).3 22
IV. Implications for the Federalist Core of Municipal Bankruptcy
Part III illustrated the informal and unconsidered channels through which a
federal court can influence a municipality and its restructuring. Although the
exact set of circumstances is unlikely to repeat, it is a mistake to consider the
Detroit Blueprint sui generis. In this part, I identify two variables particularly
affecting its viability. Then, I turn to the regulatory shortcomings of section 904
revealed by the Detroit Blueprint.
A. The Detroit Blueprint's Shadow
Some readers may be tempted to categorize Detroit as an exceptional case,
with little broader application. 323 But municipal bankruptcy cases remain
319. Supra Part IlI.C.
320. Supra notes 220-224, and accompanying text.
321. Supra Part III.D.
322. Supra Part III.E.
323. Kevyn Orr, Detroit's former emergency manager, has said, "1 caution everyone as
taking Detroit as a template or a precedent for anywhere else." November 7, 2014 Press Conference,
approximately 4:20PM, WDET DetNext report. See also Transcript of In re Trial: Objections to Chapter
9 Plan at 163-64, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 1, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 7850
(Orr recalling awareness of and concern about lengthy timelines in other contemporanous Chapter 9
cases). Judge Rhodes has said, "I think it is also true that many cities around the country will not be able
to put together what we did in Detroit, which was the grand bargain which resulted in over $800 million
from the state and from private sources coming into our pension plans." Tavis Smiley Show Interview
with Judge Rhodes, PBS, March 24, 2015 (transcript on file with author). Chief Judge Rosen, by contrast,
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relatively few and far between, and history teaches us that the truly one-off case
may not exist. Judicial creativity in challenging situations lays tracks for the
future. 314 As already noted, while the tools and techniques comprising the Detroit
Blueprint may be unexpected to municipal bankruptcy scholars, most have been
used in other complex litigation settings, in which similar elements were
portable.325
Detroit's protagonists are out and about, amplifying the lessons of the case.
Since leaving the bench, the presiding judge has spoken about the case on
television, 326 on the radio,327 on a video podcast,3 28 in newspaper interviews,32 9
at a college graduation, 330 at sponsored events at which he was honored, 331 and
at professional conferences. 33 2  He has been retained to advise the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico regarding its financial distress.333 The lead
mediator, Chief Judge Rosen, has continued to be vocal about the case.
334
has expressed hope that "we've set a template for how things can be accomplished in a political
environment and in a non-political way." Press Conference June 3, 2014.
324. Railroad equity receiverships are an early example. Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad
Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1420 (2004). More recently, cases
like Lehman Brothers, General Motors, and Chrysler were influential for Chapter II practices even though
they were considered exceptional. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 2.
325. Cf David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and
Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015 (2014) (discussing transmission of norms across institutional
reform cases).
326. Tavis Smiley Show, supra note 323.
327. Interview by WDET 101.9 FM, supra note 131.
328. Judge Rhodes Reflects on the Detroit Case, supra note 234.
329. Nathan Bomey, Q&A: Detroit bankruptcy judge on pensions, DIA, Fees, DET.
FREE PRESS, Feb. 20, 2015 (excerpts of video interview), http://www. freep.com/story/news/Ilocal/detroit-
bankruptcy/2015/02/20/judge-steven-rhodes-detroit-bankruptcy-chapter/23707897; Jack Casey, Rhodes:
Bankruptcy Critical for All of Puerto Rico, BOND BUYER, Nov. 16, 2015,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/washington-budget-finance/rhodes-bankruptcy-critical-for-all-of-
puerto-rico-1089610-1.html; James David Dickson, Steven Rhodes: Engineer of Detroit's Bankruptcy,
DET. NEWS, Nov. 5, 2015, http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/michiganians-of-
year/2015/11/05/michiganians-year-bankruptcy-court-judge-steven-rhodes/75262870.
330. Judge Rhodes to Graduates: Lessons Learned from the Detroit Bankruptcy Case,
WDET NEXT CHAPTER DET., Jan 24, 2015 (Walsh College speech),
http://www.nextchapterdetroit.com/012415-detroit-bankruptcy-judge-rhodes-speech.
331. Holly Fournier, Rhodes on Bankruptcy: We Love to Give a Second Chance, DET.
NEWS, April 22, 2015 (Bank of Ann Arbor breakfast, in Judge Rhodes' honor, at Barton Hills Country
Club), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2015/04/22/rhodes-bankruptcy-love-
give-second-chance/26177585; Christine Ferretti & Chad Livengood, Rhodes: Pension Plans Too Costly
for Cities, DET. NEWS, Feb. 25, 2015 (Crain's Detroit Business "Newsmakers of the Year" Lunch, Motor
City Casino), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2015/02/25/orr-rhodes-
reflect-end-detroit-bankruptcy/23995495.
332. The ABI Spring Meeting Lunch Talk, supra note 134, is one example.
333. Megan Davies, Puerto Rico Signals Chapter 9 Push with Ex-Detroit Judge on
Board, REUTERS, July 3, 2015. The Bankruptcy Code currently does not give Puerto Rico the ability to
authorize its municipalities to use Chapter 9, but pending legislation would change that. H.R 870 114th
Cong. (2015); S. 1774 114th Cong. (2015).
334. Lynch, supra note 234 (reporting on speech at Christ Church in Grosse Pointe
Farms, Michigan as part of the Rector Forum lecture series); Caitlin Devitt, It's Never Too Soon to
Restructure, Say Detroit Bankruptcy Vets, BOND BUYER, May 7, 2015 (reporting on panel discussion in
which Chief Judge Rosen participated at the Union League Club of Chicago),
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/its-never-too-soon-to-restructure-say-detroit-
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Professionals and parties are speaking about the Detroit Blueprint at educational
programs and in interviews. 335 More generally, repeat players abound in
municipal distress contexts. Detroit's emergency manager became Atlantic
City's consultant before he returned to his former law firm.336 Many of the
professionals involved in Detroit are now working on Puerto Rico. If and when
another big city or school district files Chapter 9, it is not hard to predict who
will be involved.
The Detroit Blueprint is associated with speed. That attribute may look
particularly attractive because, as reviewed earlier, gone are the days when a
municipality could not file without a confirmable plan already in hand, votes
counted.337 Today's municipal bankruptcies can be, like Detroit, "free fall," and
in flux.338 The possibility that a case could last many years is real, especially
because the substantive law forming the backdrop of negotiations remains
underdeveloped.3 39 In a variety of contexts, parties cite, and courts perceive, the
need for a trip through bankruptcy to be brief even though speed has costs.340
Two variables made Detroit's bankruptcy unusually amenable to strong
federal court oversight. Those variables, although dynamic, help predict the
traction of the Detroit Blueprint in other contexts.
1. Court Cooperation
Federal courts can create the conditions in which strong oversight is more,
or less, likely. A presiding judge's ability to implement elements of the Detroit
bankruptcy-vets-1072977-1 .html; David Shepardson, Gerald Rosen, Architect of The Grand Bargain,
DET. NEWS, Nov. 5, 2015; Detroit Grand Bargain Panel, The Ford School, Univ. of Mich., Oct. 21, 2015
(transcript on file with the author).
335. For example, in an interview, Detroit's former emergency manager defended the
Detroit mediation against strong-arming critiques of financial creditors. Andrew Scurria, Jones Day's Orr
Champions Muni Settlement Model, LAW 360, Apr. 29, 2015 ("Speaking generally, Orr said that capital
markets creditors were mistaken to think that closed-door mediations, often overseen by current or former
judges, can strong-arm bondholders into forfeiting valid repayment rights."),
http://www.law360.com/articles/649327/j ones-day-s-orr-champions-muni-settlement-model.
336. Hilary Russ, Orr to Leave Atlantic City Emergency Management Team, REUTERS,
Apr. 27, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-atlantic-city-orr-idUSLINOXOI Q020150427.
337. Supra Part I.A.
338. In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd., 509 B.R. 455,461 (Bankr. SD.N.Y. 2014)
(contrasting free fall cases, with no recorded creditor support, and cases that are prearranged or
prepackaged).
339. For example, how to account for residential interests and measuring the adequacy
of municipal services remain unclear. Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-
Sovereign Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888, 907, 909 (2012); C. Scott Pryor, Who Bears the Cost? The Necessity
of Taxpayer Participation in Chapter 9, 24 WIDENER L.J. 81 (2015); Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal
Bankruptcy, Essential Municipal Services, and Taxpayers' Voice, 24 WIDENER L.J. 43 (2015).
340. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 5 (discussing the difficulties of sorting between cases
in which the need for speed is legitimate and cases in which the argument is used strategically). Indeed,
the Detroit court's expert opined that the case's swift pace reduced the feasibility of the city's plan.
Transcript of In Re: Continued Trial at 24-26, In re City of Detroit (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2014) (No. 13-
53846), ECF No. 8082 (calling speed two-edge sword, win-lose situation where parties keep coming back
to city for higher payout).
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Blueprint depends on support from the judge's district court and circuit court.
The special judicial selection rule produces an opportunity for discussion and
coordination3 4' The Detroit Blueprint reflects shared philosophy and cooperation
up the chain of appellate review and command. Judge Rhodes agreed to delay
his retirement for the case on the condition that Chief Judge Rosen would be the
mediator. 342 Chief Judge Rosen's letter supporting the assignment of the case to
Judge Rhodes, and his agreement to be the mediator, reinforce the notion that
they (and possibly the former Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit) already
established a shared philosophy, and possibly a more detailed strategy. 343 In
deferring appeals, the Sixth Circuit panel and the district judge receiving appeals
accommodated the plan.344 Apparently by design, the appellate process did not
operate as a corrective to the court's oversight choices. 345
A presiding judge wishing to exercise strong oversight may not always find
reviewing and supervising courts so congenial. Without their buy-in, such a
blueprint would be difficult, particularly in a high-profile case. Moreover, a chief
circuit judge can shape the process considerably through the option to select a
judge from another district.346 Appointing a judge from outside the district
changes the dynamics of coordination. For example, the appointment of a local
federal district judge as mediator seems less likely with an out-of-town
bankruptcy judge at the helm.
341. The selection rule is not immune from calls for reform. In the 1990s, a nine-
member federal commission, divided on many other issues, unanimously proposed that Congress revert
to the ordinary random selection rule and norm for Chapter 9. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW
COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 997 (1997). The group's final report explained:
"Concern over the ability and sophistication of bankruptcy judges to handle a Chapter 9 case is no longer
well-founded. As a result, this provision of the statute should be eliminated. Chapter 9 cases should be
assigned according to the local rules and practices governing the assignment of other bankruptcy cases."
Id.
342. Lynch, supra note 234.
343. District and bankruptcy judges have coordinated and collaborated in other cases
using a different arrangement. For example, a district and bankruptcy judge jointly presided over the A.H.
Robins Chapter 11, In re A.H. Robins Co., 59 B.R. 99, 105 exhibit A (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (reprinting
district court's Administrative Order#l), but there was little question that the district judge was in control
of the case, GIBSON, supra note 98, at 190.
344. Supra notes 221, 224.
345. On the difficulty of using the appellate process as a corrective for exercises of
procedural discretion, see Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern CivilProcess,
1994 Wis. L. REV. 631 (1994); and Jacoby & Remus, supra note 30.
346. Report Together with Separate and Supplemental Views to Accompany H.R.
10624, H.R. Rep. No. 94-686, at 2 (1975) (expressing intent to give chief circuit judge flexibility to
appoint judge sitting in a different district). For example, the chief judge of the First Circuit appointed a
judge from the District of Massachusetts to preside over the Central Falls, Rhode Island bankruptcy. City
of Central Falls v. Central Falls Teachers Union, 468 B.R. 36 (Bankr. DR.I. 2012).
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2. State Law
To state the obvious, the restructuring of government debt is political, at
least in part. 34 7 If state law gives control of a municipality to an unelected
emergency manager-who also happens to be a bankruptcy lawyer-it stands to
reason that the Detroit Blueprint becomes more viable.348 An unelected
emergency manager is more likely than elected local officials to be amenable to
significant operational and financial changes, and less likely to resist
collaboration with a federal court and its team. The limited duration of the Detroit
emergency manager's appointment matched the judge's proposed expedited
timeline, further encouraging cooperation.
State law affects the viability of the Detroit Blueprint in the other direction
as well: a federal judge might be more comfortable exercising oversight if a
municipality already has experienced a "contraction of democracy," as Judge
Rhodes has phrased it, 34 9 when the federalist cost of active court oversight is
arguably more modest. Although Michigan's emergency management law is
quite controversial, it is not far-fetched to imagine other states importing some
of the law's features. New Jersey Governor Christie's tapping of Orr for Atlantic
City prompted assumptions that Michigan and Detroit were models to some
extent.3 5° Active federal court oversight also might affect states' willingness to
allow distressed municipalities access to the bankruptcy system in the first place.
Also, the variable returns to financial creditors in Detroit is prompting lobbying
for state legislation to enhance the rights of bondholders to reduce the risks
associated with federal court discretion, although the enforceability of such laws
is far from certain.
35 1
B. Section 904 as Regulatory Failure
The Detroit Blueprint treats section 904 and its consent exception as a tool
of judicial oversight. While literally consistent with the text, such an
347. Caitlin Devitt, One Year Later: Lessons from Detroit's Bankruptcy, BOND BUYER,
July 18, 2014 ("In Detroit's bankruptcy, politics has driven everything from the fast-paced schedule to
anti-bondholder rhetoric from city and state officials."),
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionainews/one-year-later-lessons-from-detroits-bankruptcy-
1064487-1 .html. See generally Gelpem, supra note 339 (discussing difficulty of imposing bankruptcy
framework on states); Adam J. Levitin, Fiscal Federalism and the Limits ofBankruptcy, in WHEN STATES
Go BROKE, supra note 78.
348. Melissa B. Jacoby, What Are the Costs of Detroit's Rise from Bankruptcy,
CONVERSATION (Nov. 20, 2014, 5:45 am), http://theconversation.com/what-are-the-costs-of-detroits-rise-
from-bankruptcy-34171.
349. ABI Spring Meeting Lunch Talk, supra note 134; In re City of Detroit, supra note
1, at 213 ("It is now time to restore democracy to the people of the City of Detroit."); Casey, supra note
329.
350. Russ, supra note 336.
351. Moringiello, supra note 53at 100.
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interpretation illustrates how the constraints of section 904 on federal courts are
not nearly as robust as often claimed.
Bankruptcy Code section 904 does not map onto how modem judges
manage cases.3 52 Section 904 calls for judicial constraint by proscribing formal
judicial acts associated with traditional adjudication: "stay, order, or decree. '3 53
I have uncovered no evidence that Congress adopted this language with a wink
or nod to courts that they should exercise control through other means. As
reviewed earlier, the message consistently has been that courts' roles are
confined to ruling on a municipality's eligibility for bankruptcy, the legality of
its plan of adjustment, and occasionally on other disputes.35 4 Whatever benefits
might flow from a more experimental system, the history of section 904 does not
suggest that Congress intended to create such a laboratory, particularly one that
does not contain a mechanism for systematic evaluation. 355
The origin of the consent exception to section 904 was as debtor
protection. 35 6 The Detroit court instead used the exception as an oversight tool.
That approach puts a premium on a municipality exercising free choice. As
previously reviewed, sometimes the presentation of options by a federal
government actor is, or perceived as, no real choice at all. 3 57 In any kind of case,
a litigant weighs the benefits of asserting rights against the risks of disappointing
the judge and the anticipated impact, whether or not accurate. 358 Chapter 9's
critics are correct that a federal court's traditional gatekeeping role gives it
considerable leverage.3 59 What they overlook is the proliferation of means and
ends through and for which that leverage might be used, to which municipalities
(and, indeed, other parties) may be reluctant to object.
For example, perhaps foundational to his case management strategy, Judge
Rhodes offered draft language and rationales for a fee examiner order,360 and a
mediation order.36' Those proposals came early, when the bankruptcy petition's
ink was barely dry, before establishment of a rhythm or rapport. Once a court
makes such proposals, could professionals rise in court and resist on behalf of
clients, while the news media recorded every move? Could the lawyers have
anticipated the scope of activity undertaken as "mediation?" What opportunities
existed to resist expansion of the scope, had the city or others wanted to do so?
Would it have been consequence-free for the emergency manager to reject Chief
352. Supra Part II.A.
353. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
354. Sources cited supra Part 1.B.I, 2.
355. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011).
356. Supra note 64.
357. Supra notes 69-73.
358. Jacoby & Remus, supra note 30 (discussing limited constraints on judiciary).
359. Supra Part I.C.
360. Supra Part II.DI.
361. Supra Part III.C.
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Judge Rosen's weekend urgings to cancel a planned pension freeze and ask him
not to call again?3 62 The role of consent is further complicated by shifts in
municipal authority. Detroit's City Council probably never had a say on the
mediation order. Upon the re-emergence of its authority, could it complain if the
lead mediator tried to go where he arguably did not belong?363
To be sure, the city asserted section 904 rights in formal litigation settings
in response to alleged creditor overreach.3 4 But the response understandably
differed when the court made the request. Recall that Judge Rhodes asked the
city, in the middle of a hearing, to bring in a water department representative,
posed a series of questions, and asked him to return the following week.3 6 It is
unimaginable that, in the middle of the bankruptcy, the city would simply refuse
to produce that representative.3 66 When that representative arrived, presumably
with little time to prepare, we would not expect to hear, "not your business, Your
Honor," in response to the judge's questions.
The tussle over managing tort claims also illustrates how a court can
leverage other powers to obtain consent. Concerned that tort claims could derail
the schedule, the court suggested a tort claimant committee, which the city did
not embrace. 367 Before it publicly proposed an alternative, the court indirectly
forced the city's hand.368 Thus, a court can piggyback off the legal rights of a
creditor to coax the debtor to do something bigger or different. The story is a
reminder that even prohibiting sua sponte requests for consent under section 904
would not eliminate the federalist cost of creative court management.
Some readers less interested in federalism as an independent value might
wonder whether this alleged regulatory failure is a problem only a law professor
could love. Didn't the court's intervention work out well for Detroit and the state
of Michigan? For example, the Grand Bargain, the centerpiece of Chief Judge
Rosen's efforts, brought hundreds of millions of dollars into the restructuring. 369
If federal court intervention creates value, they might ask, what is the harm?
Don't the ends justify the means?
362. See supra note 212.
363. See supra note 218 (discussing presence of Chief Judge Rosen at closed-door City
Council meeting).
364. The city raised a section 904 defense when third parties filed an adversary
proceeding seeking a moratorium on water shutoffs, documented supra notes 300-301. The city also
fought creditors' efforts to control the process of valuing the art collection in the DIA. Debtor's Objection
to Motion of Creditors at 6, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF
No. 4290 ("The Moving Creditors' request that the Court compel the City to cooperate in their due
diligence efforts is in direct conflict with section 904 ... .
365. Supra notes 295-298.
366. Cf G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 657 (7th Cir.
1989) (en bane) (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting limited effect of majority opinion because "it is the rare
attqmey who will invite a district judge's displeasure by defying a request to produce the client for a
pretrial conference").
367. Supra note 147.
368. Supranotes 156-158.
369. Supra Part lILB.
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Concluding that the ends justify the means is too simplistic. To start, federal
court intervention in Detroit went considerably beyond the Grand Bargain. The
cost-benefit analysis of the interventions discussed in Part III eludes easy
calculation. 37 ° Although speed associated with the court's managerial approach
reduced some costs, the court's feasibility expert worried that the swift pace
made settlements more expensive, and nearly too expensive, for the city.
371
Further, empirical research casts doubt that fee examiners-another of the
court's interventions-are associated with lower costs, at least in corporate
restructuring.372 In any event, section 904 does not, and logistically cannot,
proscribe only federal interventions that would be viewed as negative after the
fact. 373 It is hard to predict whether discretionary judicial interventions will
maximize welfare.
374
As for the Grand Bargain, it was not universally accepted that this deal
generated sufficient value in exchange for shielding the art. The distribution of
that value among competing creditors was also very much at issue. 375 Financial
creditors objected the most before settling their grievances, but other creditors,
with less robust representation in the process, also were excluded from the fruits
of that deal. Indeed, their exclusion and overall low returns were partly a result
of the court's disbandment of the creditors' committee that would have been
duty-bound to advocate for their interests.
Many individual creditors were residents of Detroit and thus arguably
entitled to the protections of federalism directly as well. 37 6 Other costs of court
control, via the consent exception or otherwise, are distinct from federalism. For
example, creditors may perceive the court as too closely aligned with the state
370. Evaluating the judicial "decisionmaking" in managerial contexts is known to be
difficult. Andrew J. Wistrich, Defining Good Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING 258 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell, eds. 2010).
371. Supra note 340.
372. Stephen J. Lubben, What We "Know" About Chapter 11 Costs Is Wrong, 17
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 141, 146, 182 (2012).
373. Whether courts or market actors are better arbiters of what should happen to a
financially distressed entity is an age-old debate. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 2.
374. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1988 (2007) (asserting that judges may be overconfident in ability to predict
settlement effects, leading them to take bolder-than-optimal steps; arguing for more detailed federal rules);
id. at 1994 (describing difficulty of judges measuring impact of their discretionary measures); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1227, 1230 (2006) (finding bankruptcy judges vulnerable to anchoring and framing effects).
375. Before they settled, bond insurers and certificate of participation holders argued
that the mediators rather than the funders excluded them from the Grand Bargain proceeds. Matthew Dolan
& Emily Glazer, Mediator Walks Fine Line Between City, Creditors, WALL ST. J. Feb. 14, 2014; Puerto
Rico Chapter 9 Uniformity Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R. 870 Before the Subcomm. On Regulatory
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Judiciary Comm, 114th Cong. 88 (2015) (testimony of
Thomas Moers Mayer) (calling Chapter 9 the "Wild West" based on variation in recoveries).
376. Supra note 71.
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and municipality. 377 In that respect, a court's use of the consent exception might
spur allegations of bias in favor of the municipal debtor. The identity of creditors
asserting disadvantage could vary from case to case. Even if one likes the
substantive result this time, what about the next? The Detroit Blueprint, taken as
a whole, suggests the absence of meaningful checks on the court.
Conclusion
The Detroit Blueprint reflects a set of judicial tools that the municipal
bankruptcy world has overlooked but have long occupied federal court and
procedure scholars. Functionally analyzing the court's handling of the case
reveals the weakness of the key statutory provision commonly associated with
judicial minimalism and meant to enforce the federalist structure of municipal
bankruptcy, section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code. Whether or not this assessment
provokes statutory reform, we must reframe the discussion of what courts do and
analyze the municipal bankruptcy system accordingly. In the meantime, and
independent of doctrine it created, the Detroit bankruptcy will generate ripples
across a variety of government distress contexts. Even if the Detroit Blueprint is
never replicated in full, we have neither seen nor heard the last of it.
377. Indeed, those dynamics generated the Leco Properties case and, in turn, the
consent exception. Supra notes 62-63. See also Dolan & Glazer, supra note 375 (discussing creditors'
mediation-related complaints); Jacoby & Remus, supra note 30 (same).
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